CITY OF CIRCLE PINES, MINNESOTA
REGULAR CITY COUNCIL MEETING

January 14, 2020
7:00 P.M.

AGENDA

1. Call to Order

2. Roll Call

Dave Bartholomay, Mayor
Matt Percy, Council Member
Mike Schweigert, Council Member
Jennifer Rauner, Council Member
Dean Goldberg, Council Member
Patrick Antonen, City Administrator

3. Setting of Agenda

Note: Consent Agenda items will be acted on with one motion unless a council member requests their placement on the regular agenda -

4. a. Taxpayer Comments
b. Council Member Comments
c. Mayor Comments

5. COMMITTEE REPORTS

a.
b.

6. COUNCIL BUSINESS

a. Consent Agenda

Item	Action
1. General Fund Disbursements (Enclosed)	Approve
2. Police Disbursements (Enclosed)	Approve
3. Fire Disbursements (Presented at Meeting)	Approve
4. Licenses (Presented at Meeting)	Approve
5. Resolution No. 2020-01 Appointing Election Judges (Enclosed)	Approve
6.	Approve

Council Action____

b. Council Appointments Boards and Commissions (Memo)

Council Action____

c. City Survey Results (Memo)

Council Action____

d. Ordinance No. 158 Short-term Rentals (Memo)

Council Action____

e. ZAYO Broadband Agreement (Memo)

Council Action____

f. ____

Council Action____

7. <u>ADJOURNMENT</u>

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
12/27/2019						
20433 BOND TRUST SERVICES CORP						
52188	4	Invoice	2nd Half Interest Payment - 2010 GO Bond	12/27/2019	6,868.91	12/19
52188	8	Invoice	PAY OFF 2010 GO BOND	12/27/2019	460,000.00	12/19
Total 52188:					466,868.91	
Total 20433 BOND TRUST SERVICES CORP:					466,868.91	
210222 US BANK CORPORATE PMT SYS						
122719	1	Invoice	VISA-AMAZON SNOW/ICE MELT	12/27/2019	108.84	12/19
122719	2	Invoice	VISA-AMAZON CELL PHONE CASE	12/27/2019	21.41	12/19
122719	3	Invoice	VISA-ADOBE CITY NEWLETTER MO FEE	12/27/2019	29.99	12/19
122719	4	Invoice	VISA-CR CARD REBATE	12/27/2019	121.81-	12/19
Total 122719:					38.43	
Total 210222 US BANK CORPORATE PMT SYS:					38.43	
Total 12/27/2019:					466,907.34	

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
12/31/2019						
130780 MN DEPT OF COMMERCE						
123119	1	Invoice	UNCLAIMED PROP HALVERSON	12/31/2019	39.49	12/19
Total 123119:					39.49	
Total 130780 MN DEPT OF COMMERCE:					39.49	
Total 12/31/2019:					39.49	
Grand Totals:					466,946.83	

Report GL Period Summary

Vendor number hash:	0
Vendor number hash - split:	0
Total number of invoices:	0
Total number of transactions:	0

Report Criteria:
Invoice Detail.GL Account = 10110100-506477506710,70210100-702499702730

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
01/03/2020						
31008 COMCAST						
11420	1	Invoice	Jan. Internet	01/14/2020	33.48	01/20
Total 11420:					33.48	
Total 31008 COMCAST:					33.48	
31320 COVERALL OF THE TWIN CITIES						
7070271789	1	Invoice	Jan. CH Cleaning	01/14/2020	293.40	01/20
Total 7070271789:					293.40	
Total 31320 COVERALL OF THE TWIN CITIES:					293.40	
Total 01/03/2020:					326.88	

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
01/06/2020						
30540 CENTURY LINK						
010320	1	Invoice	GL PHONE JAN	01/03/2020	28.41	01/20
Total 010320:					28.41	
Total 30540 CENTURY LINK:					28.41	
40326 DELTA DENTAL OF MN						
CNS0000381	1	Invoice	JANUARY DENTAL	01/03/2020	658.00	01/20
Total CNS0000381017:					658.00	
Total 40326 DELTA DENTAL OF MN:					658.00	
90200 INNOVATIVE OFFICE SOLUTION,LLC						
IN2803071	1	Invoice	SHOP TONER	12/31/2019	32.64	12/19
IN2803071	2	Invoice	SHOP TONER	12/31/2019	32.65	12/19
IN2803071	3	Invoice	POST-ITS	12/31/2019	25.93	12/19
Total IN2803071:					91.22	
Total 90200 INNOVATIVE OFFICE SOLUTION,LLC:					91.22	
Total 01/06/2020:					777.63	

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
01/08/2020						
30640 CINTAS						
4039279456	1	Invoice	Shop Cleaning	01/14/2020	9.32	01/20
4039279456	2	Invoice	Shop Cleaning	01/14/2020	9.33	01/20
Total 4039279456:					18.65	
4039279473	1	Invoice	CH Cleaning	01/14/2020	76.90	01/20
Total 4039279473:					76.90	
Total 30640 CINTAS:					95.55	
90157 I U O E LOCAL 49						
11420	1	Invoice	February Benefits	01/14/2020	881.25	01/20
11420	2	Invoice	February Benefits	01/14/2020	1,880.00	01/20
11420	3	Invoice	February Benefits	01/14/2020	235.00	01/20
11420	4	Invoice	February Benefits	01/14/2020	585.00	01/20
Total 11420:					3,581.25	
Total 90157 I U O E LOCAL 49:					3,581.25	
Total 01/08/2020:					3,676.80	

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
01/09/2020						
10230 AID ELECTRIC CORP., INC						
60890	1	Invoice	CH PRINTER ELEC TROUBLESHOOT	12/31/2019	346.50	12/19
Total 60890:					346.50	
Total 10230 AID ELECTRIC CORP., INC:					346.50	
30870 CIVIC SYSTEMS, LLC						
CVC18554	1	Invoice	6 MO SOFTWARE SUPPORT	01/14/2020	2,759.40	01/20
Total CVC18554:					2,759.40	
Total 30870 CIVIC SYSTEMS, LLC:					2,759.40	
31238 CORPORATE CONNECTION INC						
53306	1	Invoice	5 COMPUTER BAGS	12/31/2019	110.63	12/19
Total 53306:					110.63	
53358	1	Invoice	WORK PANTS DO	01/14/2020	8.34	01/20
53358	2	Invoice	WORK PANTS DO	01/14/2020	66.67	01/20
53358	3	Invoice	WORK PANTS DO	01/14/2020	8.34	01/20
Total 53358:					83.35	
Total 31238 CORPORATE CONNECTION INC:					193.98	
31335 CRAIG RAPP LLC						
011420	1	Invoice	LEADERSHIP GROUP PA COMPASS	01/14/2020	560.00	01/20
Total 011420:					560.00	
Total 31335 CRAIG RAPP LLC:					560.00	
50030 ECKBERG LAMMERS, P.C.						
122019	1	Invoice	PROSECUTIONS DEC	12/31/2019	3,552.10	12/19
Total 122019:					3,552.10	
Total 50030 ECKBERG LAMMERS, P.C.:					3,552.10	
80055 B.J. HAINES TREE SERVICE						
123119	1	Invoice	TREE REMOVALS 10 VARIOUS LOCATIONS	12/31/2019	6,800.00	12/19
123119	2	Invoice	TREE REMOVAL 114 INDIAN HILLS LANE	12/31/2019	2,500.00	12/19
Total 123119:					9,300.00	
Total 80055 B.J. HAINES TREE SERVICE:					9,300.00	
80520 HOFF BARRY, P.A.						
15527	1	Invoice	DEC GENL LEGAL	12/31/2019	3,165.00	12/19

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
Total 15527:					3,165.00	
Total 80520 HOFF BARRY, P.A.:					3,165.00	
100135 JIMMY'S JOHNNYS, INC						
159248	1	Invoice	BALDWIN PARK PORTABLE RESTROOM	12/31/2019	54.00	12/19
Total 159248:					54.00	
159249	1	Invoice	GOLDEN LAKE PORTABLE RESTROOM	12/31/2019	54.00	12/19
Total 159249:					54.00	
Total 100135 JIMMY'S JOHNNYS, INC:					108.00	
110204 KNOWLAN'S SUPER MARKETS						
123119	1	Invoice	Shop Coffee	12/31/2019	1.30	12/19
123119	2	Invoice	Shop Coffee	12/31/2019	1.30	12/19
Total 123119:					2.60	
Total 110204 KNOWLAN'S SUPER MARKETS:					2.60	
120265 LANO EQUIPMENT, INC						
02-726569	1	Invoice	STREETS BRUSH/BRISTLES	01/14/2020	646.30	01/20
02-726569	2	Invoice	SKID SHOE/AUGER BIT TOOLCAT	01/14/2020	1,320.72	01/20
Total 02-726569:					1,967.02	
Total 120265 LANO EQUIPMENT, INC:					1,967.02	
120325 LEAGUE OF MN CITIES						
311888	1	Invoice	2020 LEAD ACADEMY PS	01/14/2020	45.00	01/20
311888	2	Invoice	2020 LEAD ACADEMY PS	01/14/2020	60.00	01/20
Total 311888:					105.00	
313345	1	Invoice	2020 MCMA WINTER WORKSHOP PA	01/14/2020	50.00	01/20
Total 313345:					50.00	
Total 120325 LEAGUE OF MN CITIES:					155.00	
140890 NYSTROM PUBLISHING CO., INC.						
42702	1	Invoice	JAN NEWSLETTER	01/14/2020	939.66	01/20
42702	2	Invoice	JAN POSTAGE	01/14/2020	363.35	01/20
Total 42702:					1,303.01	
Total 140890 NYSTROM PUBLISHING CO., INC.:					1,303.01	
160520 PRESS PUBLICATIONS INC						
655071	1	Invoice	2020 MEETING DATES	01/14/2020	56.40	01/20

Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Total Cost	Per
655071	2	Invoice	2020 MEETING DATES	01/14/2020	28.20	01/20
655071	3	Invoice	2020 MEETING DATES	01/14/2020	28.20	01/20
Total 655071:					112.80	
Total 160520 PRESS PUBLICATIONS INC:					112.80	
191200 SYNCHRONY BANK						
123119	1	Invoice	ICE RINK TEST CAP	12/31/2019	5.04	12/19
123119	2	Invoice	PARKS BATTERIES	12/31/2019	11.55	12/19
Total 123119:					16.59	
Total 191200 SYNCHRONY BANK:					16.59	
Total 01/09/2020:					23,542.00	
Grand Totals:					28,323.31	

Report GL Period Summary

Vendor number hash:	0
Vendor number hash - split:	0
Total number of invoices:	0
Total number of transactions:	0

Report Criteria:
Invoice Detail.GL Account = 10110100-506477506710,70210100-702499702730

Agenda Item 6a2

Report Criteria:
Report type: Summary

GL Period	Check Issue Date	Ck No	Payee	Description	Check Amount
12/19	12/31/2019	12999	DON'S CIRCLE SERVICE	VEHICLE REPAIRS & MTC	61.92
12/19	12/31/2019	13000	EMERGENCY AUTO TECH ,INC	2017 FORD SUV CONTROL PANEL RE	180.00
12/19	12/31/2019	13001	POPP COMUNICATIONS	DSL LINE FOR WIFI	75.90
Grand Totals:					317.82

Name	Vendor #	Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Pmt Due Date	Total Cost	GL Account	GL Period
12/31/2019										
40700 DON'S CIRCLE SERVICE										
DON'S CIR	40700	218693	1	Invoi	VEHICLE REPAIRS & MTC	12/31/2019	12/31/2019	28.00	901-42-2100-404	12/19
DON'S CIR	40700	218722	1	Invoi	VEHICLE REPAIRS & MTC	12/31/2019	12/31/2019	33.92	901-42-2100-404	12/19
Total 40700 DON'S CIRCLE SERVICE:								61.92		
50150 EMERGENCY AUTO TECH ,INC										
EMERGEN	50150	SVC27	1	Invoi	2017 FORD SUV CONTROL PANEL REPAIR	12/31/2019	12/31/2019	180.00	901-42-2100-404	12/19
Total 50150 EMERGENCY AUTO TECH ,INC:								180.00		
160470 POPP COMUNICATIONS										
POPP COM	160470	992589	1	Invoi	DSL LINE FOR WIFI	12/31/2019	12/31/2019	75.90	901-42-2100-321	12/19
Total 160470 POPP COMUNICATIONS:								75.90		
Total 12/31/2019:								317.82		

12/31/2019 GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
12/19	317.82
Grand Totals:	317.82

Grand Totals: 317.82

Report GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
12/19	317.82
Grand Totals:	317.82

Vendor number hash:	292020
Vendor number hash - split:	292020
Total number of invoices:	4
Total number of transactions:	4

Terms Description	Invoice Amount	Discount Amount	Net Invoice Amount
Open Terms	317.82	.00	317.82
Grand Totals:	317.82	.00	317.82

Report Criteria:
Report type: Summary

GL Period	Check Issue Date	Ck No	Payee	Description	Check Amount	
01/20	01/03/2020	12954	T & B PAINTING LLC	INTERIOR WALL PAINTING	3,822.50-	V
01/20	01/03/2020	13004	DELTA DENTAL	JAN DENTAL	1,317.40	
01/20	01/03/2020	13005	T & B PAINTING LLC	INTERIOR WALL PAINTING	3,822.50	
Grand Totals:					1,317.40	

Name	Vendor #	Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Pmt Due Date	Total Cost	GL Account	GL Period
01/03/2020										
40300 DELTA DENTAL										
DELTA DEN	40300	CNS00	1	Invoi	JAN DENTAL COBRA CL	01/03/2020	01/03/2020	84.60	901-11600	01/20
DELTA DEN	40300	CNS00	2	Invoi	JAN DENTAL	01/03/2020	01/03/2020	1,232.80	901-42-2100-130	01/20
Total 40300 DELTA DENTAL:								1,317.40		
Total 01/03/2020:								1,317.40		

1/3/2020 GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
01/20	1,317.40
Grand Totals:	1,317.40

Grand Totals: 1,317.40

Report GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
01/20	1,317.40
Grand Totals:	1,317.40

Vendor number hash:	40300
Vendor number hash - split:	80600
Total number of invoices:	1
Total number of transactions:	2

Terms Description	Invoice Amount	Discount Amount	Net Invoice Amount
Open Terms	1,317.40	.00	1,317.40
Grand Totals:	1,317.40	.00	1,317.40

Report Criteria:
Report type: Summary

GL Period	Check Issue Date	Ck No	Payee	Description	Check Amount
12/19	12/30/2019	2019016	U S BANK	VISA ACH- MSA 2020 TRAINING BG	1,254.97
	Grand Totals:				1,254.97

Name	Vendor #	Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Pmt Due Date	Total Cost	GL Account	GL Period
12/30/2019										
210040 U S BANK										
U S BANK	210040	123019	1	Invoi	VISA ACH- OFFICE DEPOT SANDISKS	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	139.97	901-42-2100-201	12/19
U S BANK	210040	123019	2	Invoi	VISA ACH- MSA TRAINING CR	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	80.00-	901-42-2100-331	12/19
U S BANK	210040	123019	3	Invoi	VISA ACH- MN CONTINUINE ED TRAINING R	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	195.00	901-42-2100-331	12/19
U S BANK	210040	123019	4	Invoi	VISA ACH- BCA 2020 TRAINING TS	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	375.00	901-15510	12/19
U S BANK	210040	123019	5	Invoi	VISA ACH- MSA 2020 TRAINING BG	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	625.00	901-15510	12/19
Total 210040 U S BANK:								1,254.97		
Total 12/30/2019:								1,254.97		

12/30/2019 GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
12/19	1,254.97
Grand Totals:	1,254.97

Grand Totals: 1,254.97

Report GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
12/19	1,254.97
Grand Totals:	1,254.97

Vendor number hash:	210040
Vendor number hash - split:	1050200
Total number of invoices:	1
Total number of transactions:	5

Terms Description	Invoice Amount	Discount Amount	Net Invoice Amount
Open Terms	1,254.97	.00	1,254.97
Grand Totals:	1,254.97	.00	1,254.97

Report Criteria:
Report type: Summary

GL Period	Check Issue Date	Ck No	Payee	Description	Check Amount
01/20	01/08/2020	13006	ABRAMS & SCHMIDT LLC	DEC LABOR CONSULTING	812.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13007	ASPEN MILLS, INC	UNIFORM PANTS/BELT PA	7,593.45
01/20	01/08/2020	13008	COVERALL OF THE TWIN CITIES INC	CLEANING SERVICE JANUARY	780.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13009	DON'S CIRCLE SERVICE	VEHICLE REPAIRS & MTC	56.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13010	EMERGENCY CONTRACTORS	SNOW REMOVAL SERVICES JAN	815.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13011	GARY L FISCHLER & ASSOCIATES, PA	PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING EO	650.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13012	IMAGE PRINTING & GRAPHICS, INC	BUSINESS CARDS EO & ED	103.50
01/20	01/08/2020	13013	MN CHIEFS OF POLICE ASSOC	2020 MEMBERSHIP DUES	351.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13014	O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE, INC	WINDSHIELD FLUID	27.48
01/20	01/08/2020	13015	SHRED-N-GO, INC	SHREDDING SERVICE DEC	54.73
01/20	01/08/2020	13016	DENNIS SPRENG	DETECTIVE UNIFORM ALLOWANCE	500.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13017	PAUL H STEFFEL	INS AGENT OF RECORD 2020 RENEW	1,800.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13018	TELECIDE PRODUCTIONS, INC	COMPUTER MTC & SUPPORT DEC	750.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13019	TRANSUNION RISK & ALTERNATIVE	INVESTIGATION EXPENSES DEC	50.00
01/20	01/08/2020	13020	VERIZON WIRELESS	DEC CELL PHONES	1,226.79
	Grand Totals:				15,569.95

Name	Vendor #	Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Pmt Due Date	Total Cost	GL Account	GL Period
01/08/2020										
10140 ABRAMS & SCHMIDT LLC										
ABRAMS &	10140	1185	1	Invoi	DEC LABOR CONSULTING	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	812.00	901-42-2100-309	12/19
Total 10140 ABRAMS & SCHMIDT LLC:								812.00		
11565 ASPEN MILLS, INC										
ASPEN MIL	11565	010820	1	Invoi	UNIFORM ALLOWANCE 9 OFFICERS,1 INVE	01/08/2020	01/08/2020	7,500.00	901-42-2100-218	01/20
ASPEN MIL	11565	249644	1	Invoi	UNIFORM PANTS/BELT PA	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	93.45	901-42-2100-218	12/19
Total 11565 ASPEN MILLS, INC:								7,593.45		
31253 COVERALL OF THE TWIN CITIES INC										
COVERALL	31253	707027	1	Invoi	CLEANING SERVICE JANUARY	01/08/2020	01/08/2020	780.00	901-42-2100-401	01/20
Total 31253 COVERALL OF THE TWIN CITIES INC:								780.00		
40700 DON'S CIRCLE SERVICE										
DON'S CIR	40700	218746	1	Invoi	VEHICLE REPAIRS & MTC	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	28.00	901-42-2100-404	12/19
DON'S CIR	40700	218770	1	Invoi	VEHICLE REPAIRS & MTC	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	28.00	901-42-2100-404	12/19
Total 40700 DON'S CIRCLE SERVICE:								56.00		
50160 EMERGENCY CONTRACTORS										
EMERGEN	50160	931	1	Invoi	SNOW REMOVAL SERVICES JAN	01/08/2020	01/08/2020	815.00	901-42-2100-401	01/20
Total 50160 EMERGENCY CONTRACTORS:								815.00		
70335 GARY L FISCHLER & ASSOCIATES, PA										
GARY L FIS	70335	12344	1	Invoi	PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING EO	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	650.00	901-42-2100-306	12/19
Total 70335 GARY L FISCHLER & ASSOCIATES, PA:								650.00		
90026 IMAGE PRINTING & GRAPHICS, INC										
IMAGE PRI	90026	155824	1	Invoi	BUSINESS CARDS EO & ED	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	103.50	901-42-2100-203	12/19
Total 90026 IMAGE PRINTING & GRAPHICS, INC:								103.50		
130764 MN CHIEFS OF POLICE ASSOC										
MN CHIEFS	130764	9860	1	Invoi	2020 MEMBERSHIP DUES	01/08/2020	01/08/2020	351.00	901-42-2100-433	01/20
Total 130764 MN CHIEFS OF POLICE ASSOC:								351.00		
150500 O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE, INC										
O'REILLY A	150500	347243	1	Invoi	WINDSHIELD FLUID	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	27.48	901-42-2100-213	12/19
Total 150500 O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE, INC:								27.48		
190387 SHRED-N-GO, INC										
SHRED-N-	190387	100707	1	Invoi	SHREDDING SERVICE DEC	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	54.73	901-42-2100-201	12/19
Total 190387 SHRED-N-GO, INC:								54.73		
190600 DENNIS SPRENG										
DENNIS SP	190600	010820	1	Invoi	DETECTIVE UNIFORM ALLOWANCE	01/08/2020	01/08/2020	500.00	901-42-2100-218	01/20
Total 190600 DENNIS SPRENG:								500.00		

Name	Vendor #	Invoice	Seq	Type	Description	Invoice Date	Pmt Due Date	Total Cost	GL Account	GL Period
190793 PAUL H STEFFEL										
PAUL H ST	190793	2001	1	Invoi	INS AGENT OF RECORD 2020 RENEWAL	01/08/2020	01/08/2020	1,800.00	901-42-2100-361	01/20
Total 190793 PAUL H STEFFEL:								1,800.00		
200050 TELECIDE PRODUCTIONS, INC										
TELECIDE	200050	201438	1	Invoi	COMPUTER MTC & SUPPORT DEC	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	750.00	901-42-2100-403	12/19
Total 200050 TELECIDE PRODUCTIONS, INC:								750.00		
200250 TRANSUNION RISK & ALTERNATIVE										
TRANSUNI	200250	123119	1	Invoi	INVESTIGATION EXPENSES DEC	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	50.00	901-42-2100-217	12/19
Total 200250 TRANSUNION RISK & ALTERNATIVE:								50.00		
220190 VERIZON WIRELESS										
VERIZON	220190	984488	1	Invoi	DEC SQUAD LAPTOPS	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	455.13	901-42-2100-386	12/19
VERIZON	220190	984488	2	Invoi	DEC CELL PHONES	12/31/2019	01/08/2020	771.66	901-42-2100-321	12/19
Total 220190 VERIZON WIRELESS:								1,226.79		
Total 01/08/2020:								15,569.95		

1/8/2020 GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
01/20	11,746.00
12/19	3,823.95
Grand Totals:	15,569.95

Grand Totals:	15,569.95

Report GL Period Summary

GL Period	Amount
01/20	11,746.00
12/19	3,823.95
Grand Totals:	15,569.95

Vendor number hash:	1829978
Vendor number hash - split:	2050168
Total number of invoices:	17
Total number of transactions:	18

Terms Description	Invoice Amount	Discount Amount	Net Invoice Amount
Open Terms	15,569.95	.00	15,569.95
Grand Totals:	15,569.95	.00	15,569.95

RESOLUTION NO. 2020-01

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF ANOKA
CITY OF CIRCLE PINES

RESOLUTION APPOINTING ELECTION JUDGES FOR GENERAL ELECTION TO BE HELD FEBRUARY 11, 2020

WHEREAS, the City of Circle Pines will be conducting a General County Commissioner Election on February 11, 2020; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes Section 204B.21, election judges for precincts in a General Election must be appointed by the City Council; and

WHEREAS, persons selected to serve meet all requirements of MN statute and county administrative policy, and have been trained and certified pursuant to law.

NOW THEREFORE LET IT BE RESOLVED THAT, The City Council of Circle Pines as follows:

1) The individuals listed on Attachment A are hereby appointed to serve as election judges for the General County Commissioner Election to be held on February 11, 2020.

2) In the event circumstances require judges to be appointed in addition to the persons named in this resolution, the Clerk of Election is authorized to appoint as necessary, provided that the persons appointed meet all requirements of MN statute and administrative policy.

Adopted this 14th day of February, 2020 by the City Council of the City of Circle Pines.

Dave Bartholomay, Mayor
(Seal)

ATTEST:

Patrick Antonen, City Administrator

Judge Board Report, 2020 General County Commissioner Election

General Election, Tuesday, February 11, 2020

Circle Pines P-1

Centennial Fire Station # 1, 2 East Road, Circle Pines, MN 55014

- Nadine Bishop, Head Judge
- Jill Perron, Assistant Head Judge
- Donald Bisila, Election Judge
- Jacqueline Cottingham-Zierdt, Election Judge
- Becky Deters, Election Judge
- Colleen Kelley, Election Judge
- Dale Randall, Election Judge

Circle Pines P-2

Circle Pines City Hall, 200 Civic Heights Cir, Circle Pines, MN 55014

- Lesley Lilligren, Head Judge
- Peggy Sandmann, Assistant Head Judge
- Janice Boyer-Kellerman, Election Judge
- Maria Davis, Election Judge
- Nancy Ehrmantraut, Election Judge
- Kim Kelso, Election Judge
- Lynn Jorris, Election Judge
- Mark Leichtle, Election Judge
- Linda Whitney, Election Judge

City of
CIRCLE PINES

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www.circle-pines.mn.us

Agenda Item 6b

Memo

To: City Council Members
From: Patrick Antonen K
Date: January 8, 2020
Re: Council Annual Appointments

Purpose

The purpose of this memo is to provide the council with information necessary to make essential appointments for the 2020 calendar year.

Background

Many appointments that the City Council makes on a yearly basis are required by statute (i.e., official newspaper, official depository, etc.), while others are appointments annually made as a custom unique to our particular city (i.e., Park Board, etc.) The council typically will meet in work session to interview board and commission applicants. Thus, they are not included in this memo.

The list of appointments for 2020 that the Circle Pines City Council should consider is shown below:

1. **Official Newspaper** – Quad Community Press has been the official newspaper for the City. The Quad Community Press has requested designation. Request attached.

   Council Action______________________________

2. **Official Depositories** – Staff recommends that US Bank, Anoka Hennepin Federal Credit Union, Ehlers Financial, PMA Financial Network, Inc. (4M Fund), RBC Capital Markets, and Wells Fargo Bank be designated as Official Depositories for the City of Circle Pines.

   Council Action______________________________

3. **Official Signatories** – Current signatories are: Council: Dave Bartholomay and Mike Schweigert. Staff: Patrick Antonen and Kate Manson.

   Each year the council appoints two members from the council and two persons from the staff who are authorized to co-sign payroll and voucher checks.

   It should be noted that the Mayor and City Clerk are legally obligated to be signatories. The listed official signatories, including one council member, need designation.

   Council Action______________________________

4. **Civil Attorney** – Shelley Ryan - Hoff, Barry & Kozar, P. A.
Prosecution Attorney – Pat Sweeney – Eckberg Lammers

Council Action____

5. **Engineer**- Eric Eckman – WSB & Associates

Council Action____

5. **Mayor Pro Tem** -- Acts on behalf of Mayor when the Mayor is unable to attend meetings. Matt Percy was the Mayor Pro Tem.

Council Action____

COUNCIL COMMITTEE APPOINTMENTS

6. **Police Governing Board** – Mayor Bartholomay and Council Member Goldberg are representatives. Council Member Rauner has been an alternate. The action is to appoint the Mayor and one council member for a one-year term, plus an alternate.

Council Action____

7. **Fire Steering Committee –** The Joint Powers Agreement calls for appointment of two representatives and an alternate. Council Member Percy and Council Member Schweigert have been members and Council Member Goldberg has been an alternate.

Council Action____

8. **Anoka County Fire Protection Council** --The Council needs to appoint one elected official and an alternate to represent the city. Council Member Schweigert was the representative and Council Member Percy the alternate.

Council Action____

9. **Cable Commissioner** – Council Member Schweigert currently serves as the City Council representatative. The action is to appoint the mayor or a council member to a one-year term.

Council Action____

10. **Anoka County Airport Advisory Commission –**. Council members Percy and Rauner served their two–year terms so an appointment must be made for two positions.

Council Action____

Should you have any questions regarding these appointments, please do not hesitate to call.

PA

Enclosure: (1) Press Publications Request -

Press Publications
4779 Bloom Ave., White Bear Lake, MN 55110 • Phone: (651) 407-1200 • Fax: (651) 429-1242

December 10, 2019

Ms. Linda Gresback
City of Circle Pines
200 Civic Heights Circle
Circle Pines, MN 55014

Dear Ms. Gresback:

The *Quad Community Press* wishes to be considered as your official newspaper for 2020.

We continue to meet all the legal requirements under state statutes.

Our circulation is audited by Verified Audit Circulation, an independent firm.

As you know, we offer our products free to anyone who wants it and only ask for support with subscriptions.

We prefer submittal of legal notices by mail, fax at (651) 429-1242, or e-mail your notices to legals@presspubs.com - clearly labeling them as "Legal Notices."

There will be a slight increase in the rate for your legal notices this year due to increased costs in health care and paper. We are asking for $9.85 per column inch, in 7 point type at 9 lines per inch.

Our deadline for legal notices is Wednesday by 5:00 p.m. for the following Tuesday's publication. We will do our best to accommodate a notice that would be submitted after deadline if we are advised by email and a phone call by the deadline.

We welcome the opportunity to serve you and look forward to any questions or concerns you may have.

Sincerely,

Lisa Graber

Lisa Graber
Legal Notice Coordinator

LG:mp

Misc: CirclePines2019.doc

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Agenda Item 6c

Memo

To: City Council Members
From: Patrick Antonen
Date: January 8, 2020
Re: City Survey Results

Please find enclosed summary of the 2019 City Survey. We had 209 responses to our survey, down from 297 the previous year. We did send out 12 more emails than last year at 1,062 total and received a 20% response rate. The entire survey will be emailed to you and let me know if you have any questions.

Highlights:

1. 81% of respondents rate the appearance of the city Excellent or Good
2. 63% feel Very Safe in our city along with 32% feeling Somewhat Safe
3. 74% rate our fire service as Excellent or Good
4. 78% rate our police service as Excellent or Good
5. 76% felt our streets were Excellent or Good
6. 76% feel our snow plowing is Excellent or Good
7. 85% feel we have Excellent or Good Parks and Recreation
8. Overall 90% of respondents felt we had Excellent or Good Quality of Services

PA

City of
CIRCLE PINES

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total Responses		81	157	192	195	123	247	297	209
Emails sent							853	1050	1062
% Response Rate							29	28	20
Appearance		%	%	%	%	%	%		
	Excellent	17	19	15	22	29	23	21	25
	Good	74	69	69	65	59	63	63	56
	Fair	7	10	13	11	11	12	13	14
	Poor	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	4
	Don't Know	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	1
Feel Safe									
	Very Safe	73	67	63	71	73	70	69	63
	Somewhat Safe	25	29	34	26	24	25	27	32
	Somewhat Unsafe	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	4
	Very Unsafe	0	0	1	2	1	1	2	1
	Don't Know	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Quality of Fire Service									
	Excellent	35	34	42	39	37	42	43	45
	Good	30	3	31	28	33	32	29	29
	Fair	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	1
	Poor	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Don't Know	35	32	26	31	29	24	27	26
Condition of Streets									
	Excellent	11	11	9	18	14	16	20	18
	Good	59	47	42	54	66	60	56	58
	Fair	25	32	39	26	16	19	21	20
	Poor	5	10	9	2	4	5	3	4
	Don't Know	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Snow Plowing									
	Excellent	14	21	25	25	28	25	22	28
	Good	54	51	46	48	52	48	51	48
	Fair	10	17	22	15	11	17	17	14
	Poor	2	5	5	4	3	2	2	6
	Don't Know	20	6	1	8	7	8	8	4

City Survey

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Sewer Service									
	Excellent	42	40	41	39	46	43	38	46
	Good	40	46	44	47	43	46	48	41
	Fair	1	3	4	2	2	4	3	3
	Poor	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
	Don't Know	17	10	11	11	8	7	10	10

City Water		%							
	Excellent	40	37	41	42	44	37	40	42
	Good	48	49	42	44	37	52	45	43
	Fair	5	10	9	7	9	7	8	10
	Poor	5	1	3	5	4	2	1	2
	Don't Know	3	3	4	3	7	2	6	3

Police Services									
	Excellent	40	34	39	43	41	47	48	44
	Good	38	39	36	36	35	35	36	34
	Fair	5	8	7	7	7	5	6	5
	Poor	3	6	3	3	2	2	0	2
	Don't Know	15	13	16	12	16	8	9	8

Ambulance Services									
	Excellent	16	15	19	18	17	24	20	24
	Good	19	29	16	21	26	24	20	26
	Fair	4	5	3	2	0	2	2	1
	Poor	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
	Don't Know	61	51	61	59	57	50	58	49

Licensing, Inspections, Permiting									
	Excellent	10	14	9	14	14	15	14	15
	Good	38	37	40	37	33	30	36	34
	Fair	10	7	9	7	7	7	9	9
	Poor	5	5	3	2	2	4	1	3
	Don't Know	37	37	39	41	45	44	40	38

Park & Rec									
	Excellent	37	37	32	44	40	34	34	39
	Good	44	44	50	40	45	48	52	46
	Fair	5	12	10	7	6	7	8	8
	Poor	1	3	2	2	2	2	1	1
	Don't Know	12	4	6	8	7	9	5	6

City Survey

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Overall Quality of Services									
	Excellent	35	29	32	32	39	32	33	34
	Good	54	60	54	59	52	57	54	56
	Fair	7	8	9	5	4	8	8	6
	Poor	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
	Don't Know	4	3	4	4	5	2	4	5

Q1 How would you rate the overall appearance of the city?

Answered: 209 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	24.88%	52
Good	55.50%	116
Fair	14.35%	30
Poor	4.31%	9
Don't Know	0.48%	1
TOTAL		209

Q2 How would you describe your overall feeling of safety in the city?

Answered: 209 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Very Safe	62.68%	131
Somewhat Safe	31.58%	66
Somewhat Unsafe	4.31%	9
Very Unsafe	0.96%	2
Don't Know	0.00%	0
TOTAL		209

Q3 How would you rate the overall quality of fire protection services in the City?

Answered: 209 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	44.50%	93
Good	28.71%	60
Fair	0.96%	2
Poor	0.00%	0
Don't Know	25.84%	54
TOTAL		209

Q4 How would you rate the condition of the streets?

Answered: 208 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	18.27%	38
Good	58.17%	121
Fair	19.71%	41
Poor	3.85%	8
Don't Know	0.00%	0
TOTAL		208

Q5 How would you rate the overall quality of snowplowing on city streets?

Answered: 206 Skipped: 3



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	27.67%	57
Good	47.57%	98
Fair	14.56%	30
Poor	5.83%	12
Don't Know	4.37%	9
TOTAL		206

Q6 How would you rate the dependability and overall quality of city sanitary sewer service?

Answered: 207 Skipped: 2



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	45.89%	95
Good	41.06%	85
Fair	2.90%	6
Poor	0.00%	0
Don't Know	10.14%	21
TOTAL		207

Q7 How would you rate the dependability and overall quality of the city water supply?

Answered: 207 Skipped: 2



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	41.55%	86
Good	43.00%	89
Fair	10.14%	21
Poor	2.42%	5
Don't Know	2.90%	6
TOTAL		207

Q8 How would you rate police services in your city?

Answered: 208 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	44.71%	93
Good	34.13%	71
Fair	5.29%	11
Poor	1.92%	4
Don't Know	7.69%	16
Comment	6.25%	13
TOTAL		208

Q9 How would you rate the ambulance services in your city?

Answered: 208 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	23.56%	49
Good	25.96%	54
Fair	1.44%	3
Poor	0.48%	1
Don't Know	48.56%	101
TOTAL		208

Q10 How would you rate the quality of licensing, permitting and building inspection services in your city?

Answered: 208 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	15.38%	32
Good	34.13%	71
Fair	9.13%	19
Poor	2.88%	6
Don't Know	37.98%	79
TOTAL		208

Q11 How would you rate overall quality of city recreational programs and facilities (e.g. parks, trails, park facilities, etc.)?

Answered: 209 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	38.76%	81
Good	45.93%	96
Fair	8.13%	17
Poor	0.96%	2
Don't Know	6.22%	13
TOTAL		209

Q12 How would you rate the overall quality of services provided by the city?

Answered: 209 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Excellent	33.97%	71
Good	54.55%	114
Fair	5.74%	12
Poor	0.96%	2
Don't Know	4.78%	10
TOTAL		209

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Agenda Item 6d

Memo

To: City Council Members
From: Patrick Antonen
Date: January 8, 2020
Re: Ordinance 158 – Short Term Rentals

Short-term rentals have become a hot topic over the last few years. We have had complaints from neighbors about short-term rentals disrupting the neighborhoods. Therefore, after consultation with the city attorney the way to solve this problem of nightly rentals is to amend our current rental licensing code. The addition to the code will be a minimum of a 30-night stay for short-term rentals. This will solve the constant disruption of the neighborhood since a 30-night stay is the same as a month-to-month lease.

The requested action is for the council to approve the first reading of Ordinance 158 and if the council would like, they can waive the second reading and order short form publication of this Ordinance.

PA

Enclosure: (4) Ordinance and three articles relating to short-term rentals

CITY OF CIRCLE PINES
COUNTY OF ANOKA
STATE OF MINNESOTA

ORDINANCE NO. 158
(Second Series)

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CITY OF CIRCLE PINES CITY CODE CHAPTER 16, SECTION 1600- HOUSING CODE, TO PROHIBT SHORT-TERM RENTALS

THE CITY OF CIRCLES PINES DOES ORDAIN:

SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. The City finds that short-term rentals located in residential zoning districts constitute commercial use of residential property, conflict with the residential nature of the zoning districts, disrupt residential neighborhoods, and have a negative impact on the livability of residential neighborhoods. Studies indicate that short-term rental units render housing units unavailable for long-term residents and raise the cost of housing. In order to ensure adequate housing options for residents, preserve the residential character of the City's residential districts, and, likewise, to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of its residents, the City determines that it is appropriate to limit short-term rentals to hotels, motels, and similar accommodations which are appropriately zoned and have the appropriate infrastructures and services for short-term use.

SECTION 2. AMENDMENT. That the Municipal Code of Circles Pines, Minnesota, Chapter 16, is hereby amended as set forth below by adding the underlined language and deleting the ~~strikethrough~~ language as follows:

SECTION 1600 – HOUSING CODE

***

1600.03 DEFINITIONS.

The following definitions shall apply in the interpretation and enforcement of this section.

***

(y) Rental Dwelling. A dwelling or portion thereof which is rented or available for rent for a period of more than 30 days.

***

(gg) Short-Term Rental. A dwelling of one or more units, or portion thereof, in which a person or persons pay rent for occupancy, possession or tenancy of the property and where the actual term of occupancy, possession or tenancy of the property pursuant to that lease, license or other agreement is less than 30 consecutive calendar days, including, but not limited to vacation rentals, vacation homes, crash pads, hostels and the like. A short-term rental does not include hotels, motels, and resorts.

1600.21 REGISTRATION

***

(h) Short-Term Rentals Prohibited. No dwelling within the City of Circle Pines may be utilized or operated as a Short-Term Rental. Registration to operate a Short-Term rental is prohibited.

SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance shall take effect upon the date of publication.

Adopted by the City Council of the City of Circle Pines this 14th day of January, 2020.

Dave Bartholomay, Mayor

ATTEST:

Patrick Antonen, City Administrator

First Reading:

Second Reading:

Published:

(SEAL)

News from EPI

Evidence shows no compelling reason why local policymakers should keep the playing field tilted toward Airbnb

Press Releases • January 30, 2019

In a **new paper**, EPI Research Director Josh Bivens examines the economic costs and benefits of Airbnb's expansion into U.S. cities. He finds that the costs Airbnb imposes likely outweigh the benefits for city residents, and certainly provide no reason for local policymakers to change local regulations and tax structures to benefit Airbnb.

Bivens explains that the single biggest cost Airbnb imposes on communities is limiting the number of long-term rental housing units. Because housing demand is relatively "inelastic" (people's demand for somewhere to live doesn't decline when prices increase), even small changes in housing supply—like those caused by converting long-term rental properties to Airbnb units—can cause significant price increases for local residents. Housing costs have risen significantly faster than overall prices since 2000, and housing accounts for more than 15 percent of overall household consumption expenditures. In short, housing costs are a serious issue for typical American families, and anything that exacerbates their upward trend is cause for concern.

"The evidence is clear that any benefit that the introduction or expansion of Airbnb provides to a city's residents can be quickly offset by the costs it imposes," said Bivens. "Because Airbnb doesn't provide a compelling net benefit to city residents, there is little reason to think that traditional tax and regulatory structures governing travel accommodations should be changed to aid Airbnb's expansion."

One of the potential benefits of Airbnb is that it increases supply of short-term travel accommodations, and thus lowers its cost. However, the price of travel accommodations in the United States has not risen particularly quickly in recent years, and accounts for just 1 percent of overall household consumption expenditures.

Additionally, Bivens shows that while Airbnb allows property owners to diversify potential revenue streams from owning homes, the total value of housing wealth—and especially housing wealth besides primary residences—is quite concentrated among white and high-wealth households, so these benefits disproportionately accrue to the wealthy.

Another large potential cost of Airbnb expansion is the loss of tax revenue as travelers switch to Airbnb from traditional hotels. Many cities impose relatively steep taxes on short-term lodging, hoping to obtain revenue from out-of-town travelers. The most common and straightforward of these revenue raisers is a tax on traditional hotel rooms. If Airbnb expansion comes at the expense of traditional hotels, and if the apparatus for collecting taxes from Airbnb or its hosts is less well-developed than the apparatus for collecting taxes from traditional hotels, this could harm city revenues.

Short-Term Rentals and the Effects on Housing Affordability

By Mike Sheridan
October 21, 2019

(FG Trade/istock.com)

This article appeared in the Fall issue of *Urban Land* on page 247.

For more than a decade, online hospitality marketplaces such as Airbnb, HomeAway, Vrbo, and others have disrupted the global lodging industry by offering inexpensive short-term rental (STR) accommodations.

But almost from their inception, these online marketplaces—which are not subject to the regulations and fees common among hotels—have been at loggerheads with officials and local communities who blame the firms for reducing tax revenue, causing havoc in some neighborhoods, and raising housing prices.

Municipalities from New York City to Los Angeles have sought to rein in these accommodation sharing sites.

"The rapid expansion of short-term rental platforms has spurred many cities to adopt new regulations to mitigate the loss of long-term rental units and to address more localized concerns such as the increase in transient residents and local spillover effects," says Ingrid Gould Ellen, faculty director of the New York University Furman Center and Paulette Goddard Professor of Urban Policy and Planning at NYU'S Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. "The responses run the gamut from outright bans, to caps on the number of units or nights, to an array of taxes and fees."

For the past 10 years, for example, Airbnb and New York City have been involved in a high-stakes battle as city officials seek to curtail home-sharing practices, saying they aggravate the city's already critical housing crisis and pose safety risks by allowing people to transform homes into illegal hotels. The city also claims that Airbnb wants to legitimize its product in one of the world's most sought-after tourism markets.

Three thousand miles (4,800 km) away, in December 2018, the Los Angeles City Council passed a law allowing Airbnb hosts to only rent out their primary residences, defined as the place where the host lives for more than six months of the year. In addition, the law limits hosts to home sharing for 120 days per year unless they receive special approval from the city and pay extra fees.

Short-term rentals have long been an issue in Las Vegas, as some neighbors complained the rentals had become party houses and were infringing on the quality of life in the community. An ordinance passed last year set forth stringent regulations that must be followed by those seeking to operate a short-term rental; the legally licensed short-term rentals in operation before passage of the new ordinance continue to operate as they had before.

Airbnb says it is generating substantial economic benefits for hosts and communities. According to the findings of a July 2019 survey and an analysis of internal data, Airbnb's host and guest community generated over $33.3 billion in estimated direct economic impact in the United States, and hosts have earned over $65 billion, which the company says "many use to pay the bills and pursue their passions."

While online marketplaces such as Airbnb and HomeAway frequently are depicted as a boon for travelers seeking low-cost or nontraditional accommodations and for homeowners looking to expand their income stream, critics cite the impact on affordable housing.

In a January 2019 report on the effects of Airbnb, the Washington, D.C.–based Economic Policy Institute (EPI)—a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank that seeks to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions —found that rising housing costs are a key problem for American families, adding that evidence suggests that the presence of Airbnb raises local housing costs.

"The largest and best-documented potential cost of Airbnb expansion is the reduced supply of housing as properties shift from serving local residents to serving Airbnb travelers, which hurts local residents by raising housing costs. There is evidence this cost is real," says the report's author, Josh Bivens.

In New Orleans, the Jane Place Neighborhood Sustainability Initiative, a 10-year-old Community Land Trust and housing rights organization, contends that the city's STR policy offers property owners a high economic incentive to remove housing from the residential market to offer it to tourists who, attracted to the city's year-round festivals and events, will pay many times more per night than the residents who work in service industries.

"The proliferation of whole-home rentals in residential and commercially zoned neighborhoods is making it more difficult for families to return to or remain in their neighborhoods as more housing units are dedicated away from residents and towards tourist use, causing overall housing prices to rise," says Breonne DeDecker, program manager for the initiative. "Rent has sharply increased in the nine neighborhoods with the highest concentration of STRs, most notably in neighborhoods that were once working-class communities that are now vulnerable to gentrification."

Airbnb disagrees, noting that a 2016 city law brought longtime vacation rental operators in New Orleans into compliance, ensured that residents and the city could receive the full economic benefits of home sharing, and included enforcement tools for the city to take action against "bad actors" who may be, among many other factors, affecting long-term housing stock.

"Housing affordability is a challenge in New Orleans," says Molly Weedn, a spokeswoman for Airbnb. "In fact, many members of our host community have said they rely on the income they make to stay in their homes, and we remain committed to working with lawmakers to find fair solutions that balance economic opportunity with neighborhood concerns."

In May, the New Orleans City Council voted unanimously to ban "whole-home" rentals in residential neighborhoods. Under the new ordinance—which must be approved by a final vote of the city council in 90 days—hosts would have to live in the property they rent out and have a valid homestead exemption. The ordinance basically creates two categories of short-term rental—residential and commercial—based on zoning. If a resident wants to get a residential permit, the individual would have to be an owner-occupant of at least one unit on the property. For the commercial permits, no one would have to be an owner-occupant, and the STR could be a 365-day mini-hotel.

So, what happens going forward? Cities need a better understanding of how these platforms interact with housing markets and existing regulations in order to design sound policy responses, says Ellen of the NYU Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy.

"There is still a lot we don't know and a lot we need better data from Airbnb and other platforms to learn," she continues. "Like with some other hot-button issues, Airbnb generates a lot of emotional heat—as any issue will when people's homes and neighborhoods are in the balance. Our initial findings suggest that the actual impact is likely fairly limited, at least in New York City, but that doesn't mean that residents and policymakers don't have good reason to closely monitor this trend and to try and design regulatory responses that maximize the benefits while minimizing the negative side effects."

The Rise of Pop-up Hotels

By Will Macht
October 21, 2019

This article appeared in the Fall issue of *Urban Land* on page 240.

During the typical one- to two-year absorption period, developers of new apartments always have a large number of vacant units for a time. Technology-based companies and astute former developers have now raised venture capital to form companies that create and operate pop-up hotels that monetize blocks of new, fully equipped, unleased units, thereby reducing leasing risk for developers and their lenders.

Pop-up hotels represent a new hotel category. They offer complete studio and one- to three-bedroom units that include kitchens with full-size appliances, and bathrooms with washers and dryers. The properties usually include a fitness center and, often, an indoor pool. Located in luxury apartment complexes, these pop-ups include security systems and are price competitive with higher-end hotels. Although like boutique hotels in that each of their properties is different, the new companies operating pop-ups form nationally branded networks that undertake both direct online booking and booking through travel websites like Orbitz, Expedia, and Travelocity. The complete apartment units help pop-up hotels broaden the business market to include relocating corporations and the leisure market for families.

Above: Pop-up hotels, like the WhyHotel unit at Ballston Quarter, offer complete studio and one- to three-bedroom units with kitchens that include full-size refrigerators, ovens, dishwashers, and disposals. (Whyhotel)
Below: WhyHotel operates its hotel in Ballston Quarter in Arlington County, Virginia, in 175 of the 406 residential units in Brookfield Properties' 22-floor, mixed-use Origin Ballston building. The development also contains 66,000 square feet (6,000 sq m) of retail space and four levels of below-grade parking. (Brookfield Properties/CallisonRTKL Architects)

Multiple Benefits

Jason Fudin, chief executive officer of Washington, D.C.–based WhyHotel and a former multifamily developer, says developers partner with his firm because “we de-risk their projects with significant found income, early activation of the building/surrounding area, and an added on-site amenity for new residents—e.g., free room nights and cleaning services.”

The WhyHotel concept was created “by developers, for developers,” Fudin says. He piloted the concept in 2016 when he was vice president for strategic initiatives at Vornado Realty Trust, which at the time was developing the 699-unit Bartlett apartments in the Pentagon City area of Arlington County, Virginia. The company obtained approval in 2015 from the Arlington County Board to use 50 one- to three-bedroom apartments as hotel units for up to two years. The hotel units rented for $179 to $329 per night during the first five months of 2016, when the hotel component wound down because the building had reached 85 percent occupancy. Sensing the promise of the concept, Fudin left Vornado to form WhyHotel in 2017 with his partner, WhyHotel president Bao Vuong, then a vice president of development at urban mixed-use developer PN Hoffman of Washington, D.C.

WhyHotel operates 160 units on 12 floors of Monument Realty's 348-unit, 19-story building at 225 North Calvert Street in downtown Baltimore. That 1970s building, a Maryland National Bank office building before redesign, has 445 parking spaces (the blue section) that facilitate joint hotel/apartment uses. (Hord Coplan Macht Architects)

Their purpose was to operate a national network of temporary hotels—with 24/7 on-site service—in 100 to 250 units occupying up to half the space in new downtown apartment projects during absorption, typically eight to 24 months. Securing that number of units in well-located high-end apartment buildings creates enough critical mass to support furnishing and staffing a temporary hotel, which requires at least one exclusive floor to serve as its hospitality headquarters. WhyHotel scales its unit count with the normal leasing pace, gradually winding down its footprint as units are leased to long-term residents, and ultimately exiting altogether once all units are leased. That gradual wind-down gives developers the ability to spread out their lease renewals so they will not need to re-lease large portions of the building all at once.

WhyHotel has agreements with several major developers. It operates a 95-unit hotel in Equity Residential's 222-unit, 100 K Street, N.E., project in the North of Massachusetts Avenue (NoMa) section of Washington, D.C., and 160 units on 12 floors of Monument Realty's 348-unit, 19-story building at 225 North Calvert Street in downtown Baltimore. That building was a former Maryland National Bank office building redesigned for Monument by architects Hord Coplan Macht. The 1970s building has 445 parking spaces that facilitate joint hotel/apartment uses.

WhyHotel operates 175 units in Brookfield Properties' 406-unit, 22-story Origin Ballston building at Ballston Quarter, three miles (5 km) west of the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, as a pop-up hotel in a project started by Forest City Enterprises before Brookfield acquired that company. It also operates 150 units in the 27-story Rise tower at the Boro in Tysons, 11 miles (18 km) west of Washington, developed by Bethesda, Maryland–based Meridian Group, and 150 units in the 365-unit Centro Arlington project, three miles (5 km) west of the Pentagon, developed by Reston, Virginia–based Orr Partners.

WhyHotel has pursued a clustered strategy in the rapidly urbanizing mixed-use suburban areas of Washington, D.C., such as its 150-unit WhyHotel near the center of the Boro development at the Greensboro Silver Line Metro station in Tysons, Virginia, with a one-acre (0.4 ha) urban space programmed for public events. (Meridian Group/Whyhotel)

The arrangements have benefits for developers and their lenders, but also for long-term renters and the community. For developers, in addition to receiving increased income early in the absorption period, they do not need to invest capital to create the hotel component. They can promote the visibility of their new apartment building in the marketplace, gain a large number of furnished units that can serve as model units for prospective tenants, and increase activity in the building during the leasing period.

Apartment developers gain early master leases and/or revenue sharing of large blocks of units, typically up to 25 to 50 percent of the building's total. The temporary hoteliers therefore can negotiate favorable lease terms with the developer. The pop-up hotel revenue and occupancy give lenders increased confidence that apartment developers can service their outstanding debt.

Some prospective tenants, particularly those moving to the city, stay in the hotel apartments to help determine if they want to lease there and, if so, which unit size and location they prefer. Existing residents gain access to units they can use for guests, friends, and family without charge or at sharply discounted prices—on a space-available basis for promotional purposes—at their building and others in the network. Cities gain hotel tax revenues and sales tax revenues because the new hotels usually stimulate traffic at nearby restaurants and pubs. Unlike individual short-term rentals by condominium owners or apartment tenants through websites like Airbnb, developers of temporary hotels obtain prior regulatory approval for the blocks of apartment units they will operate. And because the hotels are temporary and the units would otherwise be vacant, cities can rebut arguments that temporary short-term rentals used as hotel units remove housing stock for long-term housing.

Stay Alfred operates 140 hotel units on 10 floors of the 524-unit, 45-story downtown 505 Nashville Apartments. The tower contains 350 rental apartments and 174 condominiums as well as ground-floor restaurant and retail space. Some pop-up hotels have separate hotel lobbies, like this one at the 505 Nashville Apartments. (Stay Alfred)

Vacation Rentals to Distributed Hotels

Another company in the networked apartment hotel market is Spokane-based Stay Alfred, which started business in 2012 as a vacation rental company. Stay Alfred founder and chief executive officer Jordan Allen, while still serving in the U.S. Army field artillery in 2012, got the idea for a network of apartment vacation rentals in popular downtowns while staying in a new apartment project in downtown Denver near Coors Field to see a Colorado Rockies baseball game. The Spokane native and Portland State University graduate blended his last name with that of his former business partner Conrad Manfred to form Stay Alfred, which has grown to offering more than 2,000 units in 32 U.S. cities.

Stay Alfred's business model has been shifting from leasing individual units in class A downtown apartment buildings in active cities, to master leasing entire floors of such buildings, to leasing full buildings, to entering partnerships with national apartment developers. Stay Alfred has entered into three- to five-year commercial master leases with renewal options and annual rent escalations. Such deals extend beyond normal lease-up periods and create mixed-use buildings in several projects. Some deals extend up to 15 years, says Michael Pearson, the company's real estate director.

"This flexibility allows us to tailor-fit our lease to the needs of our partners," he says, whether those needs are cash flow from anchor tenancy, debt repayment, refinance, or resale. Also, partners can experience decreases in marketing expenses, vacancy loss, turnover costs, and management fees, he says.

In New Orleans, Stay Alfred master leased the entire rehabilitated historic Factors Row building while it was being reconstructed. It now operates the property as a 49-unit apartment hotel under a three-year master lease with a two-year renewal option, and an annual 3 percent rent escalation. (Stay Alfred)

For example, in the 45-story downtown 505 Nashville Apartments, developed by Nashville-based Giarratana Development and opened in late 2017, Stay Alfred entered a five-year lease with a five-year renewal option and a 3 percent rent escalation clause on 140 units on 10 floors of the 524-unit building. The tower contains 350 rental apartments and 174 condominiums, as well as ground-floor restaurant and retail space. The lobby includes a separate check-in area. Stay Alfred says its involvement helped advance the refinance of the building a year ahead of schedule. It also operates four other short-term apartment hotel projects in Nashville.
In New Orleans, Stay Alfred master leased the entire rehabilitated historic Factors Row building during reconstruction. Stay Alfred now operates it as a 49-unit apartment hotel under a three-year master lease with a two-year renewal option, and an annual 3 percent rent escalation. It has two other hotels in New Orleans.

At Premier Lofts in Denver, Stay Alfred offers 50 apartment hotel units among the 250 in an eight-story building built in 2004 at 2200 Market Street. There it also negotiated a three-year master lease with a two-year renewal option, and an annual 3 percent rent escalation. Pearson says master leases can offer developers a hedge against declining rental rates in a saturated rental market and reduces remarketing costs. Adding a hotel component can enable apartment property owners to reinvigorate and reposition well-located older properties as more contemporary urban mixed-use projects.

Unit Pricing

Temporary hotels require dynamic pricing because hotel demand varies on a daily basis and only a small segment of that market provides competitive apartment units. As a technology-based real estate operator, Stay Alfred developed its own dynamic revenue management system to set and change rates. Its website shows the apartment buildings available in each city with starting room rates below those charged by equivalent hotels. With cleaning and other fees added, rates are comparable but units are larger. “We undertake a comprehensive analysis of the local hotel room rates that helps determine our pricing strategy for a given market, and every location typically requires its own unique pricing strategy," Fudin says.

At Premier Lofts in Denver, Stay Alfred offers 50 apartment hotel units in a 250-unit, eight-story structure. There it also negotiated a three-year master lease with a two-year renewal option, and an annual 3 percent rent escalation. Above: Because each apartment project is different, some units in pop-up hotels are two-story lofts, like this one at Premier Lofts. (Stay Alfred)

Cluster Strategy

Stay Alfred uses a cluster strategy to magnify its footprint in a city by offering diverse apartment project options in different downtown locations. In Seattle it offers units in eight locations and in Philadelphia nine, most of which are in newer buildings, but a few of which are in vintage apartment buildings. In Washington, Boston, and Atlanta it has five downtown locations in newer buildings. In Dallas, Chicago, Minneapolis, Charlotte, and Denver it has four, all in newer buildings except one in Chicago, located in a vintage building, the Seneca, a 15-story historic building constructed in 1924 as a hotel and now rehabilitated as studio and one- and two-bedroom apartments. Stay Alfred also operates in smaller cities like Spokane; Boise; and Tempe, Arizona, where it has only one or two locations.

WhyHotel has pursued a clustered strategy in the rapidly urbanizing mixed-use suburban areas of Washington, D.C. In the District's Virginia suburbs, WhyHotel opened 175 of the 406 units in the Origin Ballston building next to the redeveloped Ballston Quarter, 150 units in the Centro Arlington project, and another 150 units in the 27-story Rise tower at the Boro in Tysons. All three properties are within a few miles of one another. The firm is expanding with hotels in downtown Washington and Baltimore.

The clustering strategy enables a larger impact on a market and offers diverse location options for visitors. Although the large number of units in each WhyHotel location supports separate 24/7 on-site staff, their proximity to each other facilitates training and operational efficiencies. And because its strategy is for orderly wind-downs, clustering permits the company to shift staff to new nearby projects as they open.

WhyHotel's participation in the development stage also encourages efficient definition of check-in and circulation spaces and patterns to preclude conflicts between hotel guests and longer-term residents, which can easily occur, particularly if the building includes other uses. For example, at Park Avenue West—a building developed by TMT Development in

Portland, Oregon, that contains office, retail, and apartment uses, and designed before the advent of pop-up hotels—some guests at the Stay Alfred units wander into the office lobby, where there is 24/7 office security, rather than into the apartment lobby, where there is only a part-time concierge, reports Robert Pile, TMT executive vice president.

Pile was pleased with the project's accelerated lease-up but notes that a pop-up hotel may affect renewals, especially among residents in a high-end apartment building who did not contemplate living in a hotel, or among office tenants who might object to mixing with hotel visitors. The key is planning the uses and circulation from the beginning, Pile notes. WhyHotel's separate hospitality floors and wind-down strategy during the absorption period may minimize such conflicts.

The YotelPad Miami will be located at 227 NE Second Street in downtown Miami and will offer 222 Yotel rooms and 231 YotelPads above the hotel portion of the 30-story building. YotelPads range from two-bedroom units to studios starting at about $320,000. (Yotel/Aria Development Group)

Venture Capital

Both Stay Alfred and WhyHotel are beneficiaries of multiple venture capital rounds. In 2018, Stay Alfred raised $62 million, the first $15 million from a Seattle-based private equity group and then another $47 million in a series B funding through Nine Four Ventures, a Chicago-based real estate technology fund. In June 2018, WhyHotel first raised $3.94 million in seed funding from a consortium led by Camber Creek, a New York and Washington firm that funds operating technology companies focused on real estate. In December 2018, WhyHotel raised another $10 million in a round led by Highland Capital Partners, a Boston-based venture capital firm, with further participation from Camber Creek and others.

Those multiple financing rounds from two different groups of venture capital firms for two competitors, based on both the East and West coasts and each with distinctive growth strategies, suggest the business model for temporary apartment hotels has reached a firm enough base from which to expand and grow.

Competitors are many. “We compete with traditional hotels, vacation rentals, corporate housing, and venture-backed short-term furnished operators,” Fudin notes. He distinguishes WhyHotel from competitors. “The distributed hotel companies have a product designed (from an economic standpoint) to capitalize on the arbitrage between nightly stay rates and long-term rental apartment rates,” he says. “Our product does not look to capture that value; instead (from an economic standpoint) it looks to capture the value left on the table by developers during lease-up by putting unused inventory to work.”

Competitors have been able to attract both business and leisure travelers. Stay Alfred suggests that the largest demographic segment of its patrons is 35 to 45 years old, followed by younger millennials, with about another 15 percent being retirees. It reports that its average stay is 3.5 nights for 2.5 guests, suggesting higher occupancy and greater penetration in the extended-stay market.

A Stay Alfred in Chicago is located in a vintage building, the Seneca, a 15-story structure built in 1924 as a hotel and now rehabilitated to offer studio and one- and two-bedroom apartments. (Stay Alfred)

Alternative Models

A third model is emerging from the London-based hotelier Yotel, which operates micro-hotels in Amsterdam, Boston, Istanbul, London, Miami, New York City, Paris, and Singapore. Starwood Capital Group is one of its major shareholders. Yotel hotel rooms are small, compact spaces it calls cabins.

But in 2018 the company announced its YotelPad concept of larger, for-sale furnished units designed to be rented through Yotel’s in-house short-term rental program. Unlike the case for most condominiums that restrict the total number of rentals, Yotel’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) expressly entitle “use as a hotel/lodging unit.” Unit owners can occupy their units or place them in the hotel-unit pool to be rented by YotelPad. Newer competitors like Miami-based real estate developer Newgard Development Group, which has Natiivo-branded projects in Miami (604 units) and Austin (249 units), has projects licensed as hotels, thereby avoiding condominium CC&R or municipal short-term rental restrictions.

YotelPad Miami will be located downtown at 227 NE Second Street and will offer 222 Yotel rooms and 231 YotelPads above the hotel portion of the 30-story building. Aria Development Group and its Kuwaiti joint venture partner Aqarat are developing the project. The Miami YotelPads range from 425-square-foot (40 sq m) studios to 700-square-foot (65 sq m) two-bedroom units starting at about $320,000 for the studios. Another YotelPad project is in development in the Park City, Utah, ski resort area. It will contain 144 units starting at about 340 square feet (32 sq m) and $300,000. Vancouver, British Columbia–based Replay Destinations is developing it for a summer 2020 opening.

Market Dynamics

The surge in higher-end apartment construction has resulted in a surplus in some markets. And the easy availability of lower-priced capital through the EB-5 immigration investor program, often used for urban hotel finance, has increased hotel capacity in some locations, but there is limited capacity in others. Asked whether the temporary hotel market depends on an excess supply of apartments and an undersupply of hotel units, Fudin replied, “No, our product works as long as high-rise apartments take eight months or longer to lease up, which they always do and have.”

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The economic costs and benefits of Airbnb

No reason for local policymakers to let Airbnb bypass tax or regulatory obligations

Report • By Josh Bivens • January 30, 2019

Summary: Analysis shows that the costs of Airbnb expansion to renters and local jurisdictions likely exceed the benefits to travelers and property owners. Thus there is no reason policymakers should reverse long-standing regulatory decisions simply to accommodate the rise of a single company.

Updated March 26, 2019

Summary

"The sharing economy" refers to a constellation of (mostly) Silicon Valley–based companies that use the internet as their primary interface with consumers as they sell or rent services. Because this term is "vague and may be a marketing strategy" (AP 2019), we refer to these firms less poetically but more precisely as "internet-based service firms" (IBSFs).

Economic policy discussions about IBSFs have become quite heated and are too often engaged at high levels of abstraction. To their proponents, IBSFs are using technological advances to bring needed innovation to stagnant sectors of the economy, increasing the quality of goods and services, and providing typical American families with more options for earning income; these features are often cited as reasons why IBSFs should be excused from the rules and regulations applying to their more traditional competitors. To skeptics, IBSFs mostly represent attempts by rich capital owners and venture capitalists to profit by flouting regulations and disguising their actions as innovation.

The debates about whether and how to regulate IBSFs often involve theories about their economic costs and benefits. This report aims to inform the debate by testing those theories. Specifically, it assesses the potential economic costs and benefits of the expansion of one of the most well-known of the IBSFs: the rental business Airbnb.

Airbnb, founded in 2008, makes money by charging guests and hosts for short-term rental stays in private homes or apartments booked through the Airbnb website. It started in prototype in San Francisco and expanded rapidly, and is now operating in hundreds of cities around the world. Airbnb is frequently depicted as a boon for travelers looking for lower-cost or nontraditional accommodations, and for homeowners looking to expand their income stream. But in many local markets, the arrival and expansion of Airbnb is raising questions about its potential negative impacts on local housing costs, quality

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of life in residential neighborhoods, employment quality in the hospitality industry, and local governments' ability to enforce municipal codes and collect appropriate taxes.

In our cost-benefit analysis, we find:

- **The economic costs Airbnb imposes likely outweigh the benefits.** While the introduction and expansion of Airbnb into U.S. cities and cities around the world carries large potential economic benefits and costs, the costs to renters and local jurisdictions likely exceed the benefits to travelers and property owners.
- **Airbnb might, as claimed, suppress the growth of travel accommodation costs, but these costs are not a first-order problem for American families.** The largest and best-documented potential benefit of Airbnb expansion is the increased supply of travel accommodations, which could benefit travelers by making travel more affordable. There is evidence that Airbnb increases the supply of short-term travel accommodations and slightly lowers prices. But there is little evidence that the high price of travel accommodations is a pressing economic problem in the United States: The price of travel accommodations in the U.S. has not risen particularly fast in recent years, nor are travel costs a significant share of American family budgets.
- **Rising housing costs are a key problem for American families, and evidence suggests that the presence of Airbnb raises local housing costs.** The largest and best-documented potential cost of Airbnb expansion is the reduced supply of housing as properties shift from serving local residents to serving Airbnb travelers, which hurts local residents by raising housing costs. There is evidence this cost is real:
    - Because housing demand is relatively inelastic (people's demand for somewhere to live doesn't decline when prices increase), even small changes in housing supply (like those caused by converting long-term rental properties to Airbnb units) can cause significant price increases. High-quality studies indicate that Airbnb introduction and expansion in New York City, for example, may have raised average rents by nearly $400 annually for city residents.
    - The rising cost of housing is a key problem for American families. Housing costs have risen significantly faster than overall prices (and the price of short-term travel accommodations) since 2000, and housing accounts for a significant share (more than 15 percent) of overall household consumption expenditures.
- **The potential benefit of increased tourism supporting city economies is much smaller than commonly advertised.** There is little evidence that cities with an increasing supply of short-term Airbnb rental accommodations are seeing a large increase in travelers. Instead, accommodations supplied via Airbnb seem to be a nearly pure substitution for other forms of accommodation. Two surveys indicate that only 2 to 4 percent of those using Airbnb say that they would not have taken the trip were Airbnb rentals unavailable.
    - Studies claiming that Airbnb is supporting a lot of economic activity often vastly overstate the effect because they fail to account for the fact that much of this spending would have been done anyway by travelers staying in hotels or other alternative accommodations absent the Airbnb option.

- **Property owners do benefit from Airbnb's capacity to lower the transaction costs of operating short-term rentals, but the beneficiaries are disproportionately white and high-wealth households.** Wealth from property ownership is skewed, with higher-wealth and white households holding a disproportionate share of housing wealth overall—and an even more disproportionate share of housing wealth from nonprimary residences because they are much more likely to own nonprimary residential property (such as multi-unit Airbnb rentals).
- **The shift from traditional hotels to Airbnb lodging leads to less-reliable tax payments to cities.** Several large American cities with a large Airbnb presence rely heavily on lodging taxes. Airbnb has largely blocked the ability of these cities to transparently collect lodging taxes on Airbnb rentals that are equivalent to lodging taxes on hotel rooms. One study found that the voluntary agreements Airbnb has struck with state and local governments "[undermine] tax fairness, transparency, and the rule of law."
- **City residents likely suffer when Airbnb circumvents zoning laws that ban lodging businesses from residential neighborhoods.** The status quo of zoning regulations in cities reflects a broad presumption that short-term travelers likely impose greater externalities on long-term residents than do other long-term residents. Externalities are economic costs that are borne by people not directly engaged in a transaction. In the case of neighbors on a street with short-term renters, externalities include noise and stress on neighborhood infrastructure like trash pickup. These externalities are why hotels are clustered away from residential areas. Many Airbnb rental units are in violation of local zoning regulations, and there is the strong possibility that these units are indeed imposing large costs on neighbors.
- **Because Airbnb is clearly a business competing with hotel lodging, it should be subject to the same taxation regime as hotels.** In regard to zoning regulations, there is no empirical evidence that the net benefits of Airbnb introduction and expansion are so large that policymakers should reverse long-standing regulatory decisions simply to accommodate the rise of a single company.

Overview of the economics of Airbnb

Airbnb runs an online marketplace for short-term lodging rentals. It largely does not own dwellings or real estate of its own; instead, it collects fees by acting as a broker between those with dwellings to rent and those looking to book lodging.

The perception that Airbnb tries to foster is that its "hosts" are relatively typical households looking to earn supplementary income by renting out rooms in their homes or by renting out their entire residence when they're away. Critics argue that Airbnb bookings have become increasingly concentrated among a relatively small number of "hosts" that are essentially miniature hotel companies.[1]

Potential economic benefits

At a broad level, the potential economic benefits and costs of Airbnb are relatively straightforward.[2]

The key potential benefit is that property owners can **diversify the potential streams of revenue** they generate from owning homes. Say, for example, that before Airbnb arrived in a city, property owners setting up residential rental properties faced transaction costs so high that it only made economic sense to secure relatively long-term leases. These transaction costs incurred by property owners could include advertising for and screening of tenants and finding alternative accommodations for themselves if they were renting their own dwellings. But if the rise of internet-based service firms reduced these transaction costs and made short-term rentals logistically feasible and affordable for the first time, it could allow these property owners to diversify into short-term rentals as well as long-term rentals.

Another potential benefit is the **increased supply (and variety) of short-term rentals** available to travelers. This increased supply can restrain price growth for short-term rentals and make traveling more affordable.

Finally, one well-advertised potential benefit of Airbnb is the **extra economic activity that might result** if the rise of Airbnb spurs an increase in visitors to a city or town. Besides the income generated by Airbnb property owners, income might be generated by these visitors as they spend money at restaurants or in grocery stores or on other activities.

Potential costs

The single biggest potential cost imposed by Airbnb comes in the form of **higher housing costs for city residents** if enough properties are converted from long-term housing to short-term accommodations. If property owners take dwellings that *were* available for long-term leases and convert them to short-term Airbnb listings, this increases the supply of short-term rentals (hence driving down their price) but decreases the supply of long-term housing, increasing housing costs for city residents. (We refer to all long-term costs of shelter as “housing,” including rentals and owners’ equivalent rental costs.)

Another large potential city-specific cost of Airbnb expansion is the **loss of tax revenue**. Many cities impose relatively steep taxes on short-term lodging, hoping to obtain revenue from out-of-town travelers to spend on local residents. The most common and straightforward of these revenue raisers is a tax on traditional hotel rooms. If Airbnb expansion comes at the expense of traditional hotels, and if the apparatus for collecting taxes from Airbnb or its hosts is less well-developed than the apparatus for collecting taxes from traditional hotels, this could harm city revenues.

A further potential cost is the **externalities that property rentals (of all kinds) impose** on neighbors, for example, noise and/or use of building facilities. Since hosts are often not on-site with their renters, they do not bear the costs of these externalities and hence may not factor them into rental decisions. Of course, one could argue that such externalities are also incurred with long-term rentals not arranged through Airbnb. But if the expansion of Airbnb increases total short- and long-term rental activity, or if short-term rentals impose larger externalities than long-term rentals, then Airbnb expansion can increases these externalities.

Finally, if Airbnb expansion comes at the expense of traditional hotels, it could have a **negative impact on employment**. First, since some of the labor of maintaining Airbnb lodgings is performed by the property owners themselves, the shift to Airbnb from traditional hotels would actually reduce employment overall. Second, since the task of cleaning and maintaining rooms and even greeting Airbnb renters is often done by third-party management firms, the shift from the traditional hotel sector to Airbnb rentals could degrade job quality.

The rest of this report evaluates the potential scope of each of these benefits and costs, and ends with an overall assessment of the effect of Airbnb expansion.

Potential benefits of Airbnb introduction and expansion in U.S. cities

This section elaborates on the potential benefits identified in the previous section. For each benefit, it assesses how likely the benefit is to emerge, provides empirical estimates of the magnitude of the benefit, and discusses the likely distribution of the benefit.

Potential benefit one: Property owners can diversify into short-term rentals

The most obvious benefit stemming from the creation and expansion of Airbnb accrues to property owners who have units to rent. Owners of residential property have essentially three options for earning a return on the property: They can live in the residence and hence not have to pay rent elsewhere, they can rent it out to long-term residents, or they can rent it out to short-term visitors.

If the only barrier to renting out residential property to short-term visitors were the associated transaction costs, then in theory the creation and expansion of Airbnb could be reducing these transaction costs and making short-term rental options more viable. It does seem intuitive that transaction costs of screening and booking short-term renters would be higher over the course of a year than such costs for renting to long-term residents (or the costs of maintaining owner-occupied property). However, the potential benefits are only the *difference* between what the property owner earned before the introduction of Airbnb and what the property owners earned from short-term rentals booked through the Airbnb platform.

These potential benefits are likely quite skewed to those with more wealth. While housing is more widely held than most other assets, the total value of housing wealth is (like all wealth) quite concentrated among white and high-income households. Further, because of the myriad benefits of owning one's own residence, it is likely that much of the benefit of Airbnb's introduction and expansion accrues to those with more than one property (one for occupying and one or more for renting).[3] The distribution of property wealth generated by nonprimary residential real estate is even more concentrated than housing wealth overall. **Figure A** shows, by wealth class, the distribution of housing wealth overall and of housing wealth excluding owner-occupied housing.

This figure shows that the potential benefits of Airbnb introduction and expansion to property owners are highly concentrated. To put it simply, any economic occurrence that provides benefits proportional to owning property is one that will grant these benefits disproportionately to the wealthy. In 2016, for example, 60.0 percent of primary housing wealth (housing wealth in households' primary residences) was held by the top 20 percent

Figure A

Housing wealth—particularly wealth from owning a nonprimary residence—is skewed

Share of total primary and nonprimary household housing wealth in the U.S. economy held by each wealth class, 2016



Note: Primary housing wealth is wealth from owner-occupied housing. Nonprimary housing wealth is wealth from nonowner-occupied housing. The wealth classes depicted overlap, with the top 20 percent broken down into households falling within the 80th to 90th, 90th to 95th, and 96th to 99th percentiles.

Source: Author's analysis of microdata from the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances (2016)

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of households. (Not shown in the figure is that this share has increased by 5.4 percentage points since 1989.) As we noted earlier, however, many Airbnb listings are actually owned by households with multiple units to rent. Given this, Figure A also shows the share of housing wealth from nonprimary residences held by various groups. This "nonprimary housing wealth" is far more skewed. For example, the top 20 percent hold 90.1 percent of this type of wealth.

Figure B shows the distribution of housing wealth by race and ethnicity. Across racial groups, more than 80 percent of wealth in one's primary residence was held by white households. African American households held just 6.5 percent of wealth in primary residences, Hispanic households held 6.0 percent of this type of wealth, while households of other races and ethnicities held 6.9 percent. Not shown is the change in the share of wealth in primary residences held by racial and ethnic groups: Primary housing wealth held by nonwhite households has risen a bit (by roughly 6 percentage points) since 1989. As with the distribution by wealth class, the holdings of nonprimary housing wealth by race and ethnicity are again even more skewed, with white households holding more than 86 percent of this type of wealth. African American households hold just 5.0 percent of nonprimary housing wealth, Hispanic households hold 3.6 percent, and households of other races and ethnicities hold 5.2 percent.

Figure B

White households disproportionately benefit from housing wealth

Share of total primary and nonprimary household housing wealth held, by race and ethnicity



Note: Primary housing wealth is wealth from owner-occupied housing. Nonprimary housing wealth is wealth from nonowner-occupied housing. Hispanic means "Hispanic any race" and the race/ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive.

Source: Author's analysis of microdata from the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances (2016)

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In short, what Figures A and B show is that because wealth from residential properties that can produce rental income is concentrated among the wealthy and white households, giving property owners the unfettered option to choose Airbnb over long-term rental uses of their property means conferring an enhanced option to predominantly wealthy and white owners of housing wealth. (**Appendix Table 1** provides the same analyses shown in Figures A and B for the years 1989, 1998, and 2007, and for the most recent data year, 2016, as well as the change from 1989 to 2016.)

Finally, while Airbnb might make short-term rentals feasible for property owners by reducing transaction costs through the technological efficiencies provided by Airbnb's internet-based platform, the company might also just make short-term rentals feasible by creating a norm of ignoring regulations that bar short-term rentals. Short-term rentals are effectively banned in many residential neighborhoods in the cities where Airbnb operates, yet they have proliferated after the introduction of Airbnb.[4] The regulations barring or limiting short-term rentals were established to reduce the externalities associated with commercial operations of certain kinds—including hotel operations—in residential neighborhoods. Airbnb's business model appears to depend significantly on skirting these regulations and dodging competition from traditional hotel owners who are prohibited from operating in these same neighborhoods. If the regulations banning short-term rentals are baseless and serve no useful purpose, then subverting them could be seen as a benefit of Airbnb. But allowing large corporations such as Airbnb to simply ignore regulations—rather than trying to change them through democratic processes—is hardly the basis of sound public policy.

Potential benefit two: Increased options and price competition for travelers' accommodations

Airbnb is essentially a positive supply shock to short-term accommodations. Like all positive supply shocks, it should be expected to lower prices. There is some accumulating evidence that Airbnb does exactly this. Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers (2017) examine the effect of Airbnb expansion across cities in Texas. They find that each 10 percent increase in the size of the Airbnb market results in a 0.4 percent decrease in hotel room revenue. They find that most of this revenue decline is driven by price declines. Evidence of the positive supply shock is particularly evident in the 10 American cities where Airbnb's presence is largest. Dogru, Mody, and Suess (2019) find a negative correlation between Airbnb expansion and hotels' average daily rates in the 10 U.S. cities with the largest Airbnb presence.

Besides cost, the introduction and expansion of Airbnb could improve the perceived quality of accommodations available. There is some limited evidence that this is the case: a survey by doctoral candidate Daniel Adams Guttentag (2016) finds that "convenient location" is one of the top reasons given by Airbnb guests when asked why they chose the service. But the Guttentag 2016 survey also identifies "low cost" as the *single most-identified* reason people give when asked why they chose Airbnb.

However, it should be stressed that this potential benefit of Airbnb introduction and expansion is overwhelmingly a *redistribution* of welfare, not an *increase* in economywide welfare. Very few people have claimed that Airbnb's spread within a given city has led developers to build *more accommodations* in the city overall. Instead, owners or third parties have often turned long-term rental units into short-term lodging via Airbnb.

The question then becomes, "Has this redistribution of potential accommodations from the long-term to the short-term market increased economic welfare overall?" One way that Airbnb could be increasing economic welfare overall is if it were helping travelers deal with rising travel accommodation costs.

By looking at trends in prices and spending in the short-term lodging sector, we can get a commonsense check on whether high prices for short-term travel accommodations are a pressing economic problem for ordinary American households. If the price of short-term travel accommodations were rising rapidly, then presumably an increase in supply that restrained price increases would be valuable (or at least more valuable than if these prices were not showing any particularly trend). The two lines in **Figure C** show changes in the consumer price index for travel accommodations compared with changes in the overall price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). According to Figure C, in the 2010s, the price of short-term travel accommodations has grown faster than prices overall only since 2014—this is the same year that ushered in the large-scale expansion of Airbnb.

Figure C

The price of short-term travel accommodations has increased slightly faster than prices overall, but only in recent years

Price indices for short-term travel accommodations and overall personal consumption expenditures (PCE), 2000–2016



Source: Author's analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 2.4.4.

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So it certainly seems that the launch and growth of Airbnb was not solving any preexisting price pressure—because it was operating and expanding well before recent years' price growth. (Further, it is possible that by substituting more strongly for a less-expensive slice of the traditional hotel market—leisure travel as opposed to business travel, for example—that Airbnb introduction might actually be associated with raising measured short-term travel accommodation prices, through a composition effect.)

Potential benefit three: Travelers' spending boosts the economic prospects of cities

The lower prices and greater range of options made available by the introduction and expansion of Airbnb could, in theory, induce a large increase in travel and spark economic growth in destination cities. This is precisely the claim made in a report by NERA Economic Consulting (NERA 2017), which says that Airbnb "supported" 730,000 jobs and $61 billion in output globally, with roughly a quarter of this economic gain occurring in the United States.

To be blunt about these claims, they are flatly implausible. They rest on the assumption that all money spent by those renting Airbnb units is money that would not have been spent in some alternative accommodations had Airbnb not existed.

Say, for example, that guests at Airbnb properties spent $10 million in New York City in 2016, including the money spent at restaurants and theaters and other attractions while visiting the city. The rental payment these guests make is included in the NERA numbers, but is expressed as extra income for Airbnb hosts. NERA then takes this entire $10 million in spending (both nonaccommodation spending by visitors and the extra income going to Airbnb hosts) and runs it through input–output models to generate multiplier effects that yield their final numbers for output and employment supported in each city.

There are a number of problems with the NERA study. First, it is surprisingly opaque. It does not provide overall global and U.S. spending numbers or break these numbers into their components: nonaccommodation spending by Airbnb guests and income generated for Airbnb hosts. It also does not report the assumed size of the multiplier. Rather, it provides final numbers for global and U.S. output and employment that are functions of primary spending flows multiplied by the effects of their input–output model. The study states that it uses the well-known IMPLAN model, but IMPLAN can generate multipliers of varying size: It would be valuable to know just how large NERA is assuming the multiplier effects of this Airbnb-related spending is, just as a plausibility check.

Second, the study seems clearly written to maximize the perceived support Airbnb might provide local economies—both now and into the future. For example, toward the end of the report NERA provides several tables showing projected support for output and employment for years after the study (from 2017 to 2025). These projected *future* contributions to output and employment dwarf the contribution that is apparent in the actual data analyzed by NERA. But these projections rely on overoptimistic assumptions about Airbnb's future growth. For example, NERA forecasts growth of 75 percent for Airbnb arrivals in 2017,[5] but another study (Molla 2017) suggests that these arrivals in fact grew by closer to 25–50 percent, with growth rates particularly slowing in the U.S. and the European Union.[6]

What is by far the most important weakness of the NERA analysis is its reliance on the assumption that *all* spending done by travelers staying at Airbnb properties is spending that would not have been done had Airbnb not existed. The possibility that Airbnb visitors would still have visited a city even if Airbnb units were unavailable—by securing alternative accommodations—is completely ruled out by the NERA analysis. This is obviously an incorrect assumption. For example, it assumes that Airbnb and traditional hotels are not seen as potential substitutes for each other in the minds of travelers. But research has shown that they *are* quite close substitutes. Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers (2017) empirically assess the effect of Airbnb's expansion on the hotel industry in the state of Texas. In their introduction, they write, "Our hypothesis is that some stays with Airbnb serve as a substitute for certain hotel stays, thereby impacting hotel revenue…." In their discussions and conclusions section, they summarize what their empirical investigation has found: "Focusing on the case of Airbnb, a pioneer in shared accommodations, we estimate that its entry into the Texas market has had a quantifiable negative impact on local hotel room revenue." Put simply, this result is completely inconsistent with the assumption that Airbnb has no potential substitutes for those using its services. This in turn means that at least some of the economic activity "supported" in local economies by spending done by Airbnb guests is activity that would have been supported absent Airbnb, likely by these same guests staying in traditional hotels or other accommodations.

As discussed in a previous section, Guttentag (2016) reports the findings of a survey of Airbnb users. Among other questions, the survey explicitly asks how substitutable travelers find Airbnb lodgings. The precise question is, “Thinking about your most recent Airbnb stay—If Airbnb and other similar person-to-person paid accommodations services (e.g., VRBO) did not exist, what type of accommodation would you have most likely used?” Only 2 percent of Airbnb users responded to this question with the assertion that they would not have taken the trip. The remaining 98 percent identified other lodging possibilities that they would have used. In a similar survey that included some business travelers, Morgan Stanley Research 2017 reports near-identical findings, with between 2 and 4 percent of respondents saying that they would not have undertaken a trip but for the presence of Airbnb.[7] In both the Morgan Stanley Research survey and the Guttentag survey, roughly three-fourths of the respondents indicated that Airbnb was substituting for a traditional hotel.

If the Guttentag 2016 and Morgan Stanley Research 2017 findings are correct, this implies that NERA overstates the support Airbnb provides to local economies by somewhere between 96 and 98 percent. It is possible that some flows of spending might support more local spending when associated with Airbnb instead of traditional hotels—for example, one could argue that income accruing to Airbnb hosts is more likely to be spent locally than money paid to large hotel chains. However, the reverse is also true—for example, Airbnb rentals are far more likely to come equipped with a kitchen, and so Airbnb lodgers might be more likely to eat in rather than patronize restaurants.

Additionally, the local spillover spending associated with Airbnb expansion might not be uniform across neighborhoods. Alyakoob and Rahman (2018) document a modest increase in local restaurant spending associated with expanding Airbnb presence. Essentially, restaurants located away from central hotel cores in cities are unlikely to attract many out-of-town tourists. But if Airbnb penetration in outlying neighborhoods increases, restaurants there might now be able to tap some of this tourist market. Alyakoob and Rahman find that every 2 percent rise in Airbnb activity in a given neighborhood increases restaurant employment in that neighborhood by 3 percent. Crucially, Alyakoob and Rahman make no such calculation for potential employment-depressing effects of restaurants closer to traditional hotels. Further, they find that the boost to restaurant employment given by greater Airbnb activity does not occur in areas with a relatively high share of African American residents.

Finally, given that the overwhelming share of jobs “supported” by Airbnb are jobs that would have been supported by guests in some alternative accommodation, it seems likely that even if there is a slight increase in *spending* associated with a slight (about 2 percent) increase in visitors to a city due to Airbnb, there may well be a decline in *jobs*. We have noted previously that it is quite possible that traditional hotels are a more labor-intensive source of accommodation than are Airbnb listings. If, for example, Airbnb operators employ fewer people to provide cleaning and concierge and security services, then each dollar spent on Airbnb accommodations is likely to support less employment than each dollar spent on traditional hotel accommodations.

We can gauge the employment effect with a hypothetical scenario that assumes that the Guttentag 2016 and Morgan Stanley Research 2017 analyses are correct and that only 2 to 4 percent of the spending supported by Airbnb represents net new spending to a locality. In this case, if even half of the overall spending "supported" by Airbnb is a pure expenditure shift away from traditional hotels, and if traditional hotels are even 5 to 10 percent more labor-intensive than Airbnb units, then introducing Airbnb would actually have a *negative* effect on employment.[8]

Even if one grants that 2 to 4 percent of the output supported by Airbnb in host cities is net new spending, this spending is just a redistribution away from other, presumably less-Airbnb-intensive, localities. Given that Airbnb has tended to grow in already rich and desirable cities, it is unclear why inducing the transfer of even more economic activity away from other cities toward thriving cities would ever be viewed as a positive policy outcome.

In short, the results of the NERA study should be ignored by policymakers seeking an accurate sense of the scale of Airbnb expansion costs and benefits.[9]

Potential costs of Airbnb introduction and expansion

This section elaborates on the potential costs highlighted in the overview section. It assesses the likely outcome of these costs, estimates their empirical heft, and assesses the likely distribution of these costs.

Potential cost one: Long-term renters face rising housing costs

The mirror image of Airbnb's positive supply shock to short-term travel accommodations is its negative supply shock to long-term housing options. Again, none of the literature reviewed in this paper suggests that the introduction and expansion of Airbnb has spurred more residential construction overall, so as more units become available to Airbnb customers, this means that fewer potential housing units are available to long-term renters or owner-occupiers in a city.

Earlier, we saw that price increases in short-term travel accommodations have been in line with overall consumer price increases in recent years, suggesting that there is no obvious shortage in short-term accommodations. (It is important to note that the tracking of short-term travel accommodation prices and overall prices was tight well before Airbnb was exerting any serious effect one way or the other on prices.) However, national prices of long-term housing are rising faster than overall prices, suggesting a shortage of long-term housing. Because of this above-inflation growth in long-term housing costs, any trend that exacerbates this increase is more damaging than if these prices had been relatively flat in recent years. **Figure D** shows inflation in the price indices for housing (long-term rentals as

Figure D

Housing costs are rising faster than costs of short-term accommodations or overall consumer goods

Price indices for housing, short-term travel accommodations, and overall personal consumption expenditures (PCE), 2000–2016



Note: The housing price index includes both long-term rentals as well as imputed rents for owner-occupied housing.

Source: Author's analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 2.4.4

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well as imputed rents for owner-occupied housing) and for short-term travel accommodations, and in the overall personal consumption expenditures index. In recent years, long-term housing price growth has clearly outpaced both overall price growth and increases in the price of short-term travel accommodations. This recent rise in the inflation rate of long-term housing, in fact, has become a much-discussed policy challenge that has spurred much commentary and analysis over the past decade.

The fact that the cost of long-term housing has become a prime source of economic stress for typical Americans should be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of Airbnb's introduction and expansion. Crucially, demand for housing is quite inelastic, meaning that households have little ability to forgo housing when it becomes more expensive. When demand is inelastic, even relatively small changes in housing supply can cause significant changes in the cost of housing.[10] This intuition is clearly validated in a number of careful empirical studies looking precisely at the effect of Airbnb introduction and expansion on housing costs.

According to these studies, Airbnb—though relatively new—is already having a measurable effect on long-term housing supply and prices in some of the major cities where it operates. For example, Merante and Horn (2016) examine the impact of Airbnb on rental prices in Boston. The authors construct a rich data set by combining data on weekly rental listings from online sources and data from Airbnb listings scraped from web pages. They find that each 12 Airbnb listings per census tract leads to an increase in asking rents of 0.4 percent. It is important to note that this is a finding of causation, not just correlation. They put this finding in perspective as follows:

> If Airbnb's growth rate in 2015, 24%, continues for the next three years, assuming constant mean rents and total number of housing units, Boston's mean asking rents in January 2019 would be as much as $178 per month higher than in the absence of Airbnb activity. We further find evidence that Airbnb is increasing asking rents through its suppression of the supply of rental units offered for rent. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in Airbnb listings [an average of 12 units per census tract] relative to total housing units is correlated with a 5.9% decrease in the number of rental units offered for rent. (Merante and Horn 2016)

Barron, Kung, and Proserpio (2018) undertake a similar exercise with different data. They create a data set that combines Airbnb listings, home prices and rents from the online real estate firm Zillow, and time-varying ZIP code characteristics (like median household income and population) from the American Community Survey (ACS). To account for the fact that rents and Airbnb listings might move together even if there is no causal relationship (for example, if both are driven by the rising popularity of a given city), they construct an instrumental variable to identify the causal effect of rising Airbnb listings on rents. Using this instrument, they find that a 10 percent increase in Airbnb listings in a ZIP code leads to a 0.42 percent increase in ZIP code rental prices and a 0.76 percent increase in house prices. They also find that the increase in rents is larger in ZIP codes with a larger share of nonowner-occupied housing. Finally, like Merante and Horn, they find evidence that Airbnb listings are correlated with a rise in landlords shifting away from long-term and toward short-term rental operations.

Sheppard and Udell (2018) also undertake a similar exercise, looking within neighborhoods of New York City. Their key finding is that a doubling of Airbnb activity within a tight geographic zone surrounding a home sale is associated with a 6 to 11 percent increase in sales prices. Their coefficient values are quite close to those from Barron, Kung, and Proserpio (2018).[11]

Wachsmuth et al. (2018) apply the regression results identified by Barron, Kung, and Proserpio (2018) to the large increase in Airbnb rentals in New York City. They find a 1.4 percent increase in NYC rents from 2015 to 2017 due to Airbnb's expansion in that city. For the median NYC renter, this implies a $384 annual increase in rent from 2015 to 2017 due to Airbnb's expansion over that time.

Potential cost two: Local government tax collections fall

For the localities making policy decisions regarding the expansion of Airbnb, perhaps the single biggest consideration is fiscal. Across the United States, total lodging taxes are significant: For the 150 largest cities, the all-in lodging tax rate (including state, county, and city taxes) averaged more than 13 percent (Hazinski, Davis, and Kremer 2018). The temptation for any given locality to set relatively high lodging tax rates (particularly when compared with overall sales tax rates) seems clear—city residents pay little of the lodging tax but still enjoy the benefits funded by the tax. For a number of cities, the total revenue collected is substantial. In 2016, for example, New York City and Las Vegas each collected well over $500 million in lodging taxes, and San Francisco collected just under $400 million.

It seems odd to exclude Airbnb stays from the lodging tax, yet the tax treatment of Airbnb rentals is inconsistent and incomplete. The company has entered into a number of tax agreements with state and local governments and is clearly trying to build the impression that it wants to help these governments collect taxes. Yet a number of tax experts argue that Airbnb's efforts to collect and remit lodging taxes (as well as other taxes) have been wholly insufficient.

A description in Schiller and Davis 2017 of the state of Airbnb's tax agreements as of early 2017 highlights the patchy, voluntary nature of the tax regime that Airbnb faces:

> Airbnb, whose operations in some instances may violate traditional local zoning and rental ordinances, has sought to legitimize its business by negotiating agreements with cities under which it will collect local sales and lodging taxes. "Working together, platforms like Airbnb can help governments collect millions of dollars in hotel and tourist tax revenue at little cost to them," the company stated in a "policy tool chest" it offered in late 2016.
>
> Overall, by Airbnb's count, the company is collecting sales, hotel, or other taxes in 26 states and the District of Columbia (DC) as of March 1, 2017. State-level taxes are collected in 18 of those states. Among this group, some or all local-level taxes are also being collected in every state except Connecticut, which lacks local lodging taxes. In the remaining eight states, Airbnb collects a patchwork of local taxes but no state taxes. In three states—Alaska, Maryland, and New Jersey—Airbnb's tax collection is limited to a single locality (Anchorage, Montgomery County, and Jersey City, respectively). The company has dramatically expanded its tax collection practices in recent years and appears poised to continue its expansion in the months and years ahead. Airbnb recently announced that it will soon begin collecting state lodging taxes in Maine, for instance.

Dan Bucks, a former director of the Montana Department of Revenue and former executive director of the Multistate Tax Commission, wrote a report assessing the tax agreements that Airbnb has struck with state and local governments in different parts of the country. His central finding is that these agreements "[undermine] tax fairness, transparency, and the rule of law" (Bucks 2017).

Bucks examines 12 of the Airbnb tax agreements from across the country that had been made public by mid-2017. He describes them as follows:

> Airbnb devises and presents to tax agencies what are typically ten to twelve-page documents covering back-tax forgiveness, prospective payments, information

> access and multiple other terms that produce, as this report documents, serious negative consequences for society. Airbnb labels these documents as “voluntary collection agreements,” which they most assuredly are not. These Airbnb-drafted documents do not guarantee the proper collection of taxes due. They block tax agencies from verifying the accuracy of Airbnb payments. Airbnb may be seeking to superficially to liken these documents to the high quality “voluntary disclosure agreements” that states use to bring non-compliant taxpayers into full conformity with the law. However, these documents profoundly undermine sound tax administration and the rule of law. For these and other reasons detailed below, we will not use Airbnb’s misleading label for these documents but will refer to them objectively as “Airbnb agreements.” (Bucks 2017)

The most specific criticism Bucks makes is that these agreements have largely been kept secret from the public, in clear contrast to other “voluntary disclosure agreements.” This secrecy, combined with agreements to “cede substantial control of the payment and audit processes to Airbnb,” make it impossible for tax authorities to ensure proper payment of lodging taxes. Bucks also argues that these agreements between Airbnb and state and local governments provide large benefits to third parties (Airbnb hosts) who are not signatories and are not obligated to provide anything in exchange for these benefits.

In 2016, an analysis from AlltheRooms.com forecast that Airbnb’s failure to ensure the full payment of lodging taxes was on track to cost subnational governments a combined $440 million in revenue unless policymakers moved to guarantee proper payment. Of the total, $110 million in lost revenue was for New York City alone. In October 2016, shortly after the AlltheRooms.com analysis was released, New York City passed restrictions on Airbnb advertisements for rentals of less than 30 days when an owner is not present. While these restrictions may have stemmed the loss of revenue relative to the AlltheRooms.com projection, the analysis that predated the restrictions highlight how the unregulated expansion of Airbnb, and its cannibalization of traditional hotel business market share, could still have large fiscal implications for New York and other cities.

Finally, even if Airbnb were to fully comply with the local jurisdiction’s tax system on lodgings and pay the same tax rate per dollar earned as traditional hotels, there likely would still be some small fiscal losses stemming from Airbnb’s expansion. The primary appeal of Airbnb to most travelers is lower-price accommodations, so even if the same tax rate were paid on Airbnb rentals as is paid on hotel rooms, the lower Airbnb prices would lead to less tax revenue accruing to local governments.

Potential cost three: Externalities inflicted on neighbors

When owners do not reside in their residential property, this can lead to externalities imposed on the property’s neighbors. If absentee owners, for example, do not face the cost of noise or stress on the neighborhood’s infrastructure (capacity for garbage pickup, for example), then they will have less incentive to make sure that their renters are respectful of neighbors or to prevent an excessive number of people from occupying their property.

These externalities could be worse when the renters in question are short term. Long-term renters really do have some incentive to care about the neighborhood's long-run comity and infrastructure, whereas short-term renters may have little to no such incentive. Further, some Airbnb hosts are renters themselves who are subletting a long-term rental property to short-term travelers, which may further shield the ultimate property owners from bearing the costs faced by immediate neighbors. In cities where the spread of Airbnb has become a political issue, hundreds (if not thousands) of complaints have been made in this regard.[12]

The potential for such externalities has been broadly recognized for a long time and was a consideration leading to the prevalence of zoning laws that ban short-term travel accommodations in residential neighborhoods. There is a reason, for example, why Times Square in New York City is a cluster of hotels while the Upper East Side is largely a less noisy cluster of residential dwellings. There is of course no reason why such past zoning decisions need to be completely sacrosanct and never changed, but these decisions were made for a reason, and changes to them should be subject to democratic debate.

While researchers have often noted the possibility that Airbnb may impose externalities on the communities surrounding Airbnb units, we know of no empirical estimates of these externalities. If these externalities were powerful enough in degrading the desirability of neighborhoods, they could in theory lead to reduced rents and home prices. From the evidence of the previous section, we know that Airbnb adoption in neighborhoods has actually boosted rental and home prices. But this price boost doesn't mean these externalities don't exist—it simply means that price-depressing externalities are offset by the supply effect of moving properties out of the long-term rental market.

Miller (2016) makes an interesting (if likely too abstract) policy proposal for dealing with the externalities associated with home rental via Airbnb. He proposes creating a market in "transferable sharing rights," in which, for example, each resident of a neighborhood would be given the right to rent out one housing unit for one night. Most residents in a neighborhood won't want to rent out their home. But those who do want to rent out units using Airbnb would want far more than the right to rent out these properties for just one night. To obtain the right to rent out their properties for more nights, they would need to purchase permits from their neighbors. The price it takes to obtain these permits would provide a good indicator of the true costs of the externalities imposed by Airbnb. A city that experimented with these tradeable sharing rights could provide very useful information.

Potential cost four: Job quantity and quality could suffer

We have noted already that when Airbnb enters and expands in a city, it shifts traveler business from hotels to Airbnb, leading to downward price pressure for hotels. This shift from traditional hotels to Airbnb properties also implies either a shift in jobs or a reduction in jobs. As an example, take hotel cleaning workers. As more visitors to a city pick Airbnb units over traditional hotel accommodations, the need for cleaning doesn't go away. Instead, it is either foisted on Airbnb proprietors, done by third-party cleaning services, or left unmet and thus implicitly imposing costs on both travelers and the surrounding neighborhood (think of improperly disposed-of trash).

Given that much of the growth of Airbnb in recent years has been driven by hosts with multiple properties (which, when in a single location, are in effect mini hotels), it is not surprising to see an emergence of cleaning services specifically serving Airbnb hosts.[13] These new cleaning services may be less likely to offer decent wages relative to traditional travel lodging; it may also be more difficult for workers to unionize in this context. For example, in the 10 U.S. cities with a particularly large Airbnb presence (including New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago), combined unionization rates for maids and cleaners in the hotel industry are nearly double the unionization rates of maids and cleaners in other industries in the economy.[14]

In some sense, the shift in cleaning jobs from traditional hotels to cleaning services for Airbnb hosts is likely analogous in its economic effects to what happens when traditional hotels outsource their own cleaning staffs. Dube and Kaplan (2010) demonstrate large negative wage effects stemming from this type of domestic outsourcing for janitors and security guards. Their findings are reinforced by recent analysis of the German labor market by Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017), who find similar large negative effects of domestic outsourcing on a range of occupations, including cleaners. While these studies do not directly examine the effect of substituting in-house hotel cleaning jobs for Airbnb cleaning jobs, they both track the effect of "fissuring" between the entity that uses and pays for the service and the entity that manages the service providers. This fissuring has been a key and troubling feature of the American labor market in recent decades, and it is hard to see how the substitution of Airbnb for traditional hotels does not potentially constitute another layer of this fissuring.[15]

This potential for Airbnb to degrade the quality of cleaning jobs is recognized even by the company itself: Airbnb offers hosts the opportunity to advertise that they have taken the "living wage pledge" by committing to pay a living wage to the cleaners and servicers of their properties. It is not clear how commitment to this pledge is (or can be) enforced, however.

Conclusion: Airbnb should have to play by the same rules as other lodging providers

The current policy debates sparked by the rise of Airbnb have largely concerned tax collections and the emergence of "mini hotels" in residential neighborhoods. At its inception, Airbnb advertised itself as a way for homeowners (or long-term renters) to rent out a room in their primary residence, or as a way for people to rent out their dwellings for

Figure E

Housing costs matter much more to household budgets than short-term lodging costs

Shares of average household personal consumption expenditures devoted to housing vs. short-term travel accommodations, 1979, 2000, and 2016



Note: The housing price index includes both long-term rentals as well as imputed rents for owner-occupied housing.

Source: Author's analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 2.5.5

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short periods while they themselves are traveling. However, in recent years Airbnb listings and revenues have become dominated by "multi-unit" renters—absentee property owners with multiple dwellings who are essentially running small-scale lodging companies on an ongoing basis.

This evolution of Airbnb into a parallel hotel industry raises questions about the preferential treatment afforded to this rental company. These questions include, "Why isn't Airbnb required to ensure that lodging taxes are collected, as traditional hotels are?" And, "Why is Airbnb allowed to offer short-term rentals in residential neighborhoods that are not zoned for these uses, while traditional hotels are not allowed in these same neighborhoods?"

While there are plenty of other considerations, the spread of Airbnb seems at its core to be a shift of potential housing supply from the long-term residential housing market to the market for short-term accommodations. This shift of supply can lower prices for travelers but raise housing prices for long-term residents. This seems like a bad trade-off, simply based on the share of long-term housing expenses versus short-term travel expenses in average family budgets. **Figure E** presents the share of total personal consumption expenditures accounted for by housing and by short-term travel accommodations. As the figure shows, housing costs eat up far more of the average household's budget, and rising housing prices mean that long-term housing has grown more as a share of family budgets than short-term travel accommodations.

This rising cost of housing has become a major economic stress for many American households. Anything that threatens to exacerbate this stress should face close scrutiny. A reasonable reading of the available evidence suggests that the costs imposed on renters' budgets by Airbnb expansion substantially exceed the benefits to travelers. It is far from clear that any other benefits stemming from the expansion of Airbnb could swamp the costs it imposes on renters' budgets.

There may be plenty wrong with the status quo in cities' zoning decisions. But the proper way to improve local zoning laws is not to simply let well-funded corporations ignore the status quo and do what they want. As this report shows, there is little evidence that the net benefit of accelerated Airbnb expansion is large enough to justify overturning previous considerations that led to the regulatory status quo—in fact, the costs of further Airbnb expansion seem likely to be at least as large, if not larger, than the benefits.

About the author

Josh Bivens joined the Economic Policy Institute in 2002 and is currently EPI's director of research. His primary areas of research include macroeconomics, social insurance, and globalization. He has authored or co-authored three books (including *The State of Working America, 12th Edition*) while working at EPI, has edited another, and has written numerous research papers, including for academic journals. He appears often in media outlets to offer economic commentary and has testified several times before the U.S. Congress. He earned his Ph.D. from The New School for Social Research.

Appendix Table 1

Distribution of housing wealth (primary and nonprimary), by household characteristics

	1989	1998	2007	2016	1989–2016 change
Primary residence					
Bottom 50 percent	9.8%	14.3%	12.7%	10.4%	0.7%
Bottom 80 percent	45.4%	47.5%	44.0%	40.0%	-5.4%
Top 20 percent	54.6%	52.5%	56.0%	60.0%	5.4%
80th–90th percentile	19.9%	17.9%	17.5%	18.6%	-1.3%
90th–95th percentile	12.6%	11.6%	11.0%	13.9%	1.3%
96th–99th percentile	15.6%	15.0%	18.2%	16.8%	1.2%
Top 1 percent	6.5%	8.0%	9.3%	10.7%	4.3%
Nonprimary residential property					
Bottom 50 percent	2.6%	4.3%	2.2%	1.6%	-1.0%
Bottom 80 percent	16.8%	18.1%	13.9%	9.9%	-6.9%
Top 20 percent	83.2%	81.9%	86.1%	90.1%	6.9%
80th–90th percentile	15.2%	16.8%	10.7%	12.6%	-2.7%
90th–95th percentile	20.6%	15.5%	13.9%	14.9%	-5.7%
96th–99th percentile	28.7%	28.7%	34.0%	29.6%	0.9%
Top 1 percent	18.6%	21.0%	27.5%	32.9%	14.3%
Primary residence					
White, non-Hispanic	86.4%	87.5%	82.6%	80.6%	-5.9%
Black, non-Hispanic	4.9%	5.0%	6.2%	6.5%	1.6%
Hispanic, any race	4.1%	3.7%	6.1%	6.0%	2.0%
Other	4.6%	3.7%	5.1%	6.9%	2.3%
Nonprimary residential property					
White, non-Hispanic	87.3%	89.5%	84.2%	86.2%	-1.1%
Black, non-Hispanic	4.3%	4.1%	4.1%	5.0%	0.7%
Hispanic, any race	3.1%	3.4%	6.7%	3.6%	0.5%
Other	5.3%	3.0%	5.0%	5.2%	-0.1%

Note: Per the Survey of Consumer Finances definitions, primary housing wealth is the total value of the primary residence of a household. Nonprimary housing wealth includes the value of all of other residential real estate owned by the household, including one-to-four family structures, timeshares, and vacation homes.

Source: Author’s analysis of microdata from the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances (2016)

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Endnotes

1. According to a recent report, “a significant—and rapidly growing—portion of Airbnb’s revenue in major U.S. cities is driven by commercial operators who rent out more than one residential property to short-term visitors” (CBRE 2017).

2. Horton and Zeckhauser (2016) provide a deep dive into the economics of internet-based service firms. Slee (2017) provides an excellent popularization of some of the economic issues surrounding IBSFs from a deeply critical perspective.

3. The most obvious benefit to living in housing that one owns is the tax treatment of mortgage interest payments on owner-occupied property, which can be deducted from federal taxes. Another benefit is that the implicit rental income earned by owner-occupiers is not taxed (the money that owner-occupiers are saving by not having to pay rent elsewhere could be viewed as implicit rental income).

4. Wachsmuth et al. (2018), for example, find that just under half of Airbnb listings in New York City had likely taken illegal reservations.

5. “Arrivals” is a term referring to each stay in a unit, regardless of length of stay.

6. For example, Molla (2017) highlights more recent forecasts for 2017 indicating a large slowdown in U.S. Airbnb expansion.

7. The range of 2 to 4 percent represents the range of findings across 2015, 2016, and 2017. The value was 4 percent in 2015, 2 percent in 2016, and 3 percent in 2017.

8. The arithmetic on this is relatively straightforward. The NERA 2017 study asserts that Airbnb supports $14 billion in spending and 130,000 jobs in the United States. This implies each $107,690 supports a job. Say that half of this spending is the direct cost of accommodations and that it represents a pure expenditure shift away from traditional hotels. Assume further that traditional hotels are 5 percent more labor-intensive—so each traditional hotel job is supported by $102,300 in spending (5 percent less than the ratio identified by Airbnb). This shift from traditional hotels to Airbnb hence reduces employment by 3,400 jobs for each $7 billion in spending. Even if overall spending were to rise by 2 percent due to Airbnb’s expansion, this would increase employment by only roughly 2,600 jobs. The key insight here is that once one allows Airbnb to substitute for other forms of accommodation, the link between output and employment might change significantly.

9. Airbnb itself has commissioned and reported on a number of studies claiming that the share of guests who would not have taken the trip absent Airbnb is as high as 30 percent. Even this number is far larger than the independent assessments of Guttentag (2016) and Morgan Stanley Research (2017), but it does highlight just how outlandish the NERA assumption on this is.

10. In a review of housing markets, Albouy, Ehrlich, and Liu (2016) note that “Housing demand is income and price inelastic.”

11. The geographic unit implicitly being examined by Sheppard and Udell (2018) is not intuitive. Their observation is an individual home sale. They then track Airbnb listings within five different radii of the sale: 150, 300, 500, 1,000, and 2,000 meters. They interact the number of Airbnb listings with categorical variables for each of the five “buffer zones” defined by the radii and use this as an explanatory variable predicting sales prices.

12. See Office of New York State Attorney General 2014.

13. Lawler (2014) notes that Airbnb was testing out dedicated cleaning services for its hosts as early as 2014.

14. Unionization rates derive from the author's analysis of data pooled from 2008–2017 from the Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Code and results are available upon request. The 10 cities are Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Miami, New York City, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. In these 10 cities, the unionization rate for maids and cleaners was 23.2 percent in the traveler accommodation industry, but 12.1 percent in all other industries.

15. See Weil 2017 for an overview of labor market fissuring.

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Errata

This report was updated March 26, 2019, to correct errors in the “Bottom 50 percent” rows in Appendix Table 1. These rows had incorrectly shown the numbers for the top 50 percent instead of for the bottom 50 percent.

Anoka County
COUNTY ADMINISTRATION
Information Technology

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Agenda Item 6e

December 18, 2019

Patrick Antonen
City of Circle Pines
200 Civic Heights Circle
Circle Pines, MN 550014

Re: Connectivity Services Agreement with Community Anchor Institution(s) for Broadband Services at Co-Location Site(s) (CSA)

Dear Mr. Antonen:

As you may recall, the City of Circle Pines has executed an Agreement with the County of Anoka to participate in the Connect Anoka County (CAC) Network. (Anoka County Contract #2011-0125/C0000609 and Amendment 1.) The current term of this Agreement expires on August 16, 2020 with two remaining 5-year renewal terms upon written notice from both parties. The formal written notice needs to be made no less than 180 days prior to expiration (February 17, 2020). The Agreement does not specify the form of the notification, but the County prefers a letter of intent followed by a formal amendment. While the signed formal amendment is not required until February 17, 2020, the County would appreciate receiving the signed documents in the enclosed addressed envelope by February 1, 2020.

The County does desire to renew the terms of the CSA with the City of Circle Pines. The County has previously received informal communications that the City of Circle Pines is also in agreement with continuing participation in the CAC network. In anticipation of renewal, the County has drafted a contract Amendment to be executed if the City of Circle Pines concurs with renewing the City of Circle Pines Agreement. The draft Amendment is attached. Current service levels will continue unless the City of Circle Pines amends Attachment A to the Agreement. Attachment A may be amended at any time without amending the Agreement otherwise, however, if service is discontinued at any location, that change will be viewed as permanent.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 763-324-5389.

Sincerely,

Kathryn M. Timm
Assistant Anoka County Attorney
Kathryn.Timm@co.anoka.mn.us

KMT:gla
Attachments

cc: Scott Schulte, Chair, Anoka County Board of Commissioners
Rhonda Sivarajah, Anoka County Administrator
Susan Vreeland, Chief Information Officer
Dan Lekatz, Deputy Director

Anoka County Contract No. 2011-0125/C0000609B

AMENDMENT NO. 2
TO
Connectivity Services Agreement
With Community Anchor Institution(s)
For Broadband Services
At Co-Location Service Site(s)

THIS AMENDMENT is made this 17th day of August, 2020, the date of the signature of the parties notwithstanding, by and between the County of Anoka, a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, 2100 Third Avenue, Anoka, Minnesota 55303, hereinafter referred to as the "County," and the City of Circle Pines, 200 Civic Heights Circle, Circle Pines, MN 550014, hereinafter referred to as the "Entity."

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the County wishes to amend its Agreement with the Entity for Connectivity Services on the Connect Anoka County Network which was effective upon the completion of build and go live of the ZAYO System in 2013; and

WHEREAS, the Agreement was previously amended on August 16, 2015 to provide for continued services until August 16, 2020; and

WHEREAS, the Agreement provides for two additional renewal amendments; and

WHEREAS, Paragraph XII. MODIFICATIONS of said Agreement provides that any material alterations, modifications or variations of the terms of this Agreement shall be valid and enforceable only when they have been reduced to writing as an amendment and signed by the parties.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter stated or contained in the Agreement, the parties do hereby agree as follows:

1. The parties agree to change Paragraph VI. TERM, as follows:

A. This Agreement will be for a period commencing on the date of signing by both parties, and continuing until August 16, 2015 (Initial Term), with up to a total of three (3) renewal periods of additional five (5) years terms (Renewal Terms) upon written amendment. Both parties shall provide written notice of intent to renew this agreement not less than one hundred eighty days (180) before the end of the Initial Term or Renewal Term. For purposes of this agreement, written notices shall be sent to the addresses of each of the Parties as indicated above. Upon the termination or expiration of this Agreement, Anoka County shall have no further obligation to provide Services and no further liability to Entity. Upon termination or expiration of this agreement, ZAYO shall be provided a reasonable opportunity to retrieve its equipment from the co-location service site(s). At the request of the entity, ZAYO will remove equipment from individual terminated co-location sites within a mutually agreed time not to exceed 180 days. Upon termination of Entity's connectivity service from a co-location site, without terminating this entire agreement, ZAYO, at the request of the entity, shall remove its equipment from said co-location site within a mutually agreed time not to exceed 180 days and any underlying rights for that co-location site shall terminate with the removal without further action or notice by any party. Any underlying rights granted by the Entity under this Agreement shall terminate or expire with the Agreement without need for further action or notice by any party.

B. *Pursuant to the above paragraph, both parties have sent written notice to each other one hundred eighty (180) days or more in advance of August 16, 2015 indicating the desire to renew the agreement for the next five (5) years. The commencement date of the new term is August 17, 2015 and the new expiration date is August 16, 2020.*[7] ~~The Agreement may be renewed under these same terms, conditions and procedures for an additional two (2) terms.~~

C. Pursuant to paragraph A., both parties have sent written notice to each other more than one hundred eighty (180) days in advance of August 20, 2020 indicating the desire to renew the agreement for the next five (5) years. The commencement date of the new term is August 17, 2020 and the new expiration date is August 16, 2025. The Agreement may be renewed under these same terms, conditions and procedures for one (1) additional term.

D. If there have been any changes in service levels at the time of this Amendment, the parties will execute and attach updated Attachment A.

2. This Amendment is hereby made a part of and shall be amended to the Agreement of the parties.

3. All other terms and conditions of the original Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

SIGNATURE PAGE TO FOLLOW

7 This language will become obsolete after August 16, 2020.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Amendment on the dates written below.

COUNTY OF ANOKA

By: ______________________________
Scott Schulte, Chair
Anoka County Board of Commissioners

Dated: ______________________

By: ______________________________
Rhonda Sivarajah
County Administrator

Dated: ______________________

ENTITY

By: ______________________________

Its: ______________________________

Dated: ______________________

By: ______________________________

Its: ______________________________

Dated: ______________________

APPROVED AS TO FORM

By: ______________________________
Kathryn Timm
Assistant County Attorney

Dated: ______________________

Anoka County
COUNTY ADMINISTRATION
Information Technology

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Entity Contact Information Form

Site 53 - Circle Pines City Hall

Billing Contact:

Name: ____________________

Position: ____________________

Company Name: ____________________

Mailing Address: ____________________

____

Office Phone: ____________________

Email: ____________________

Technical Contact:

Name: ____________________

Position: ____________________

Office Phone: ____________________

Cell Phone: ____________________

Email: ____________________

Building Access Contacts - Entity shall provide 24-hour, 7-day a week access for the purposes of maintenance, service, and upgrades of the equipment and system.

List contacts in the order you would wish them to be called.

Business Hours - Contact #1:

Name: ____________________

Position: ____________________

Office Phone: ____________________

Cell Phone: ____________________

Email: ____________________

Business Hours - Contact #2:

Name: ____________________

Position: ____________________

Office Phone: ____________________

Cell Phone: ____________________

Email: ____________________

Non-Business Hour Contacts – These contacts should be available after hours and have building access to the equipment location. They may be called in case of such emergencies as equipment failures, fiber hits, storm damage, emergency locates, etc.

List contacts in the order you would wish them to be called.

After Hours - Contact #1:

Name: ____________________

Position: ____________________

Cell Phone: ____________________

Home Phone: ____________________

Email: ____________________

After Hours - Contact #2:

Name: ____________________

Position: ____________________

Cell Phone: ____________________

Home Phone: ____________________

Email: ____________________

Anoka County
COUNTY ADMINISTRATION
Information Technology

connect AnokaCounty

Entity Contact Information Form

Site 55 - Circle Pines Public Works

Billing Contact:

Name: ______________________________

Position: ______________________________

Company Name: ______________________________

Mailing Address: ______________________________

____

Office Phone: ______________________________

Email: ______________________________

Technical Contact:

Name: ______________________________

Position: ______________________________

Office Phone: ______________________________

Cell Phone: ______________________________

Email: ______________________________

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List contacts in the order you would wish them to be called.

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Name: ______________________________

Position: ______________________________

Office Phone: ______________________________

Cell Phone: ______________________________

Email: ______________________________

Business Hours - Contact #2:

Name: ______________________________

Position: ______________________________

Office Phone: ______________________________

Cell Phone: ______________________________

Email: ______________________________

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Home Phone: ______________________________

Email: ______________________________

After Hours - Contact #2:

Name: ______________________________

Position: ______________________________

Cell Phone: ______________________________

Home Phone: ______________________________

Email: ______________________________